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The final version of the ''Tractatus'' was completed in 1918, but difficulties arose in finding anyone willing to publish it. <s>willing to print a work too long to be a journal article and too short to be a standalone book</s>. Additionally, Wittgenstein insisted on not publishing the book at his own expense, considering it an affront to what he regarded as the work of his life. '''[I understood that W's motivation was not to force his book on the world. I think he says as much in a letter to someone, perhaps Russell. We could find that and quote it here. JE 27/11/23]''' A German edition dated 1921, but actually published in early 1922, appeared in the journal Annalen der Naturphilosophie under the title of Logisch-Philosphische Abhandlung, but Wittgenstein repudiated it as a "pirated edition" because of mistakes and alterations made during the printing process. Therefore, the edition he considered correct was the one published in London by Kegan Paul in 1922, whose iconic title was suggested by G. E. Moore. This edition had a parallel English text translated by F. P. Ramsey, edited by C. K. Ogden, and reviewed and approved by Wittgenstein. It was also accompanied by an Introduction written by Russell, but one which Wittgenstein regarded as containing many confusions. | The final version of the ''Tractatus'' was completed in 1918, but difficulties arose in finding anyone willing to publish it. <s>willing to print a work too long to be a journal article and too short to be a standalone book</s>. Additionally, Wittgenstein insisted on not publishing the book at his own expense, considering it an affront to what he regarded as the work of his life. '''[I understood that W's motivation was not to force his book on the world. I think he says as much in a letter to someone, perhaps Russell. We could find that and quote it here. JE 27/11/23]''' A German edition dated 1921, but actually published in early 1922, appeared in the journal Annalen der Naturphilosophie under the title of Logisch-Philosphische Abhandlung, but Wittgenstein repudiated it as a "pirated edition" because of mistakes and alterations made during the printing process. Therefore, the edition he considered correct was the one published in London by Kegan Paul in 1922, whose iconic title was suggested by G. E. Moore. This edition had a parallel English text translated by F. P. Ramsey, edited by C. K. Ogden, and reviewed and approved by Wittgenstein. It was also accompanied by an Introduction written by Russell, but one which Wittgenstein regarded as containing many confusions. | ||
Despite their remarkable depth, the fundamental ideas of the ''Tractatus'' can be summarized in relatively few lines. "The world is everything that is the case" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#1|1]]) is the proposition that opens the book, dedicated to the relationship between reality and language. Wittgenstein essentially suggests that all meaningful propositions speak of "atomic facts" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#2|2]]), which are possible situations '''[can't use the word "situation" to translate ''Sachverhalt'' (atomic fact/state of affairs) because that's the word that is used as the translation of ''Sachlage'', corresponding to a *non-atomic* possible situation. JE 11/12/23]''' , that is, configurations of objects. Language reproduces these connections by designating each object with a simple sign, and a propositional sign is a "picture of reality" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#4.01|4.01]]) formed by combining these simple signs. The possibility of representation that links the world, thought, and linguistic expression reveals the presence of structural relationships among these entities, which Wittgenstein qualifies as "the logical form, that is, the form of reality" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#2.18|2.18]]). This “picture-theory”, as it has been called, leads to the idea that logic is the common foundation of the world and language, by which every statement is connected to the state of affairs it represents. However, the symbolic expression that transforms pure representational logical connections into communications within everyday language often generates distortions of the representational projection; these | Despite their remarkable depth, the fundamental ideas of the ''Tractatus'' can be summarized in relatively few lines. "The world is everything that is the case" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#1|1]]) is the proposition that opens the book, dedicated to the relationship between reality and language. Wittgenstein essentially suggests that all meaningful propositions speak of "atomic facts" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#2|2]]), which are possible situations '''[can't use the word "situation" to translate ''Sachverhalt'' (atomic fact/state of affairs) because that's the word that is used as the translation of ''Sachlage'', corresponding to a *non-atomic* possible situation. JE 11/12/23]''', that is, configurations of objects. Language reproduces these connections by designating each object with a simple sign, and a propositional sign is a "picture of reality" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#4.01|4.01]]) formed by combining these simple signs. The possibility of representation that links the world, thought, and linguistic expression reveals the presence of structural relationships among these entities, which Wittgenstein qualifies as "the logical form, that is, the form of reality" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#2.18|2.18]]). This “picture-theory”, as it has been called, leads to the idea that logic is the common foundation of the world and language, by which every statement is connected to the state of affairs it represents. However, the symbolic expression that transforms pure representational logical connections into communications within everyday language often generates distortions of the representational projection; these distortions constitute “the most fundamental confusions (of which the whole philosophy is full)” ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#3.324|3.324]]). In other words, “language disguises the thought” ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#4.002|4.002]]). | ||
The purpose of philosophy, which Wittgenstein qualifies as the "activity" of "the logical clarification of thoughts" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#4.112|4.112]]), is thus the dissolution of philosophical problems themselves through the simple elucidation of the "logic of language" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#4.002|4.002]]). Adhering to the logicist program, Wittgenstein expresses the belief that this activity can be better conducted through the analysis (that is, the examination and reduction into further indivisible signs, [[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#2.0201|2.0201]]) of the propositions that give rise to misunderstandings, ultimately aiming to develop an unambiguous logical ideography (which he himself employed in a form he developed) | The purpose of philosophy, which Wittgenstein qualifies as the "activity" of "the logical clarification of thoughts" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#4.112|4.112]]), is thus the dissolution of philosophical problems themselves through the simple elucidation of the "logic of language" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#4.002|4.002]]). Adhering to the logicist program, Wittgenstein expresses the belief that this activity can be better conducted through the analysis (that is, the examination and reduction into further indivisible signs, [[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#2.0201|2.0201]]) of the propositions that give rise to misunderstandings, ultimately aiming to develop an unambiguous logical ideography (which he himself employed in a form he developed) that renders errors and misinterpretations impossible. While it is evident that Wittgenstein adopts a rational approach, he maintains that philosophy cannot be regarded on par with science. Instead, "all philosophy”, he writes, “is ‘Critique of language’" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#4.0031|4.0031]]): its task it to examine and clarify the language used in philosophical discourse rather than constructing a separate body of knowledge akin to scientific theories. | ||
What is illustrated by Wittgenstein here follows what he anticipates in the Preface when he asserts that "what can be said at all can be said clearly": philosophy delimits the thinkable and, therefore, what can be spoken of, by circumscribing meaningful combinations of signs within language and drawing a limit between everything that can be meaningfully expressed and what is mere nonsense. Since language and the world have symmetrical formal relationships, "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#5.6|5.6]]), a famous aphorism with which the author introduces a series of brief and striking reflections on the theme of solipsism and the "metaphysical subject" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#5.633|5.633]]), expressing scepticism towards any form of sound philosophical discussion about the self. In fact, Wittgenstein adds, the peculiarity of the philosophical endeavour is that the limit of language (and hence of the world) is itself not susceptible to a meaningful linguistic representation because "propositions […] cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—the logical form" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#4.12|4.12]]). | What is illustrated by Wittgenstein here follows what he anticipates in the Preface when he asserts that "what can be said at all can be said clearly": philosophy delimits the thinkable and, therefore, what can be spoken of, by circumscribing meaningful combinations of signs within language and drawing a limit between everything that can be meaningfully expressed and what is mere nonsense. Since language and the world have symmetrical formal relationships, "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#5.6|5.6]]), a famous aphorism with which the author introduces a series of brief and striking reflections on the theme of solipsism and the "metaphysical subject" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#5.633|5.633]]), expressing scepticism towards any form of sound philosophical discussion about the self. In fact, Wittgenstein adds, the peculiarity of the philosophical endeavour is that the limit of language (and hence of the world) is itself not susceptible to a meaningful linguistic representation because "propositions […] cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—the logical form" ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English)#4.12|4.12]]). | ||