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Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway: Difference between revisions
Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway (view source)
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From the fact that I ''see'' that one spot is to the left of another, or that one colour is darker than another, it seems to follow that it ''is'' so; and if so, this can only be if there is an ''internal'' relation between the two; and we might express this by saying that the ''form'' of the latter is part of the ''form'' of the former. We might thus give a sense to the assertion that logical laws are ''forms'' of thought and space and time ''forms'' of intuition. | From the fact that I ''see'' that one spot is to the left of another, or that one colour is darker than another, it seems to follow that it ''is'' so; and if so, this can only be if there is an ''internal'' relation between the two; and we might express this by saying that the ''form'' of the latter is part of the ''form'' of the former. We might thus give a sense to the assertion that logical laws are ''forms'' of thought and space and time ''forms'' of intuition. | ||
Different logical types can have nothing whatever in common. But the mere fact that we can talk of the possibility of a relation of n places, or of an analogy between one with two places and one with four, shews that relations with different numbers of places have something in common, that therefore the difference is not one of type, but like the difference between different | Different logical types can have nothing whatever in common. But the mere fact that we can talk of the possibility of a relation of n places, or of an analogy between one with two places and one with four, shews that relations with different numbers of places have something in common, that therefore the difference is not one of type, but like the difference between different names—something which depends on experience. This answers the question how we can know that we have really got the most general form of a proposition. We have only to introduce what is ''common'' to all relations of whatever number of places. | ||
The relation of "I believe p" to "p" can be compared to the relation of' "p" says (besagt) p' to p: it is just as impossible that ''I'' should be a simple as that "p" should be. <!--[''Cf''. 5.542.]--> | The relation of "I believe p" to "p" can be compared to the relation of' "p" says (besagt) p' to p: it is just as impossible that ''I'' should be a simple as that "p" should be. <!--[''Cf''. 5.542.]--> | ||