Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (English): Difference between revisions

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The mutual spatial position of these things then expresses the sense of the proposition.
The mutual spatial position of these things then expresses the sense of the proposition.


{{ParTLP|3.1432}} We must not say, “The complex sign ‘''aRb''’ says ‘''a'' stands in relation ''R'' to ''b''’”; but we must say, “''That ‘a''’ stands in a certain relation to ‘''b''’ says ''that aRb''”.
{{ParTLP|3.1432}} We must not say, “The complex sign ‘''aRb''’ says ‘''a'' stands in relation ''R'' to ''b''’”; but we must say, “''That'' ‘''a''’ stands in a certain relation to ‘''b''’ says ''that aRb''”.


{{ParTLP|3.144}} States of affairs can be described but not ''named''.
{{ParTLP|3.144}} States of affairs can be described but not ''named''.
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(And in modern epistemology (Russell, Moore, etc.) those propositions have been conceived in this way.)
(And in modern epistemology (Russell, Moore, etc.) those propositions have been conceived in this way.)


{{ParTLP|5.542}} But it is clear that "A believes that ''p''", "A thinks ''p''", "A says ''p''", are of the form "'''p''<nowiki/>' says ''p''": and here we have no co-ordination of a fact and an object, but a co-ordination of facts by means of a co-ordination of their objects.
{{ParTLP|5.542}} But it is clear that "A believes that ''p''", "A thinks ''p''", "A says ''p''", are of the form "<nowiki>'</nowiki>''p''<nowiki>'</nowiki> says ''p''": and here we have no co-ordination of a fact and an object, but a co-ordination of facts by means of a co-ordination of their objects.


{{ParTLP|5.5421}} This shows that there is no such thing as the soul—the subject, etc.—as it is conceived in contemporary superficial psychology.
{{ParTLP|5.5421}} This shows that there is no such thing as the soul—the subject, etc.—as it is conceived in contemporary superficial psychology.