Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway: Difference between revisions

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(1) Take φx. We want to explain the meaning of 'In "φx" a ''thing'' symbolizes'. The analysis is:—
(1) Take φx. We want to explain the meaning of 'In "φx" a ''thing'' symbolizes'. The analysis is:—


(∃y) . y symbolizes . y = "x" . "φx"
:(∃y) . y symbolizes . y = "x" . "φx"


["x" is the name of y: "φx" = '"φ" is at [the] left of "x"' and ''says'' φx.]
["x" is the name of y: "φx" = '"φ" is at [the] left of "x"' and ''says'' φx.]
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If you had any unanalysable proposition  in which  particular  names and relations occurred (and ''unanalysable'' proposition = one in  which only fundamental symbols = ones  not  capable of  ''definition'', occur) then you can always form from it a proposition of the form (∃x, y, R). xRy, which though it contains no particular names and relations, is unanalysable.
If you had any unanalysable proposition  in which  particular  names and relations occurred (and ''unanalysable'' proposition = one in  which only fundamental symbols = ones  not  capable of  ''definition'', occur) then you can always form from it a proposition of the form (∃x, y, R). xRy, which though it contains no particular names and relations, is unanalysable.


(2) The point can here be brought out as follows. Take  φa and φA:
(2) The point can here be brought out as follows. Take  φa and φA: and ask what is meant by saying, "There is a thing in φa, and a complex in φA"?
 
:(1) means: (∃x) . φx . x = a
 
:(2) means: (∃x, ψξ) . φA = ψx . φx.<ref>ξ is Frege's mark of an ''Argumentstelle'', to show that ψ is a ''Funktionsbuchstabe''. [''Edd''.]</ref>
 
''Use of logical propositions.'' You may have one so complicated that you cannot, by looking at it, see that it is a tautology;  but  you have shewn that it can be derived by certain operations from certain other propositions according to our rule for  constructing  tautologies; and hence you are enabled to see  that  one thing  follows  from another, when you would not have been able to see it otherwise. E.g., if our tautology is of [the] form p ⊃ q you can  see  that  q follows  from p; and so on.
 
Th ''Bedeutung'' of a proposition is the fact that corresponds to  it, e.g., if our proposition be "aRb", if it's true, the corresponding fact would be the fact aRb, if false, the fact ~aRb. ''But'' both "the fact aRb" and "the fact ~aRb" are incomplete symbols, which must be analysed.
 
That a proposition has a relation (in wide sense) to Reality,  other 0an that of  ''Bedeutung,'' is shewn  by the fact that you can understand it when you don't know the ''Bedeutung'', i.e. don't know whether it is true or false. Let us express this by saying "It has ''sense"'' (''Sinn'')''.''
 
In analysing ''Bedeutung,'' you come upon ''Sinn'' as follows: We want to explain the relation of propositions  to reality.
 
The  relation is as follows: Its ''simples'' have meaning =  are names of simples; and its relations have a quite different relation to relations; and these two facts already establish a sort of correspondence between proposition which contains these and only these, and reality: i.e. if all the simples of a proposition are known, we already know that we CAN  describe  reality by saying  that  it  ''behaves''<ref>Presumably "verhält sich zu", i.e. "is related." [''Edd''.]</ref> in  a certain  way  to the whole proposition.
 
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