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Th ''Bedeutung'' of a proposition is the fact that corresponds to it, e.g., if our proposition be "aRb", if it's true, the corresponding fact would be the fact aRb, if false, the fact ~aRb. ''But'' both "the fact aRb" and "the fact ~aRb" are incomplete symbols, which must be analysed. | Th ''Bedeutung'' of a proposition is the fact that corresponds to it, e.g., if our proposition be "aRb", if it's true, the corresponding fact would be the fact aRb, if false, the fact ~aRb. ''But'' both "the fact aRb" and "the fact ~aRb" are incomplete symbols, which must be analysed. | ||
That a proposition has a relation (in wide sense) to Reality, other | That a proposition has a relation (in wide sense) to Reality, other than that of ''Bedeutung,'' is shewn by the fact that you can understand it when you don't know the ''Bedeutung'', i.e. don't know whether it is true or false. Let us express this by saying "It has ''sense"'' (''Sinn'')''.'' | ||
In analysing ''Bedeutung,'' you come upon ''Sinn'' as follows: We want to explain the relation of propositions to reality. | In analysing ''Bedeutung,'' you come upon ''Sinn'' as follows: We want to explain the relation of propositions to reality. | ||
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It only remains to fix the method of comparison by saying ''what'' about our simples is to ''say'' what about reality. E.g., suppose we take two lines of unequal length: and say that the fact that the shorter is of the length it is is to mean that the longer is of the length ''it'' is. We should then have established a convention as to the meaning of the shorter, of the sort we are now to give. | It only remains to fix the method of comparison by saying ''what'' about our simples is to ''say'' what about reality. E.g., suppose we take two lines of unequal length: and say that the fact that the shorter is of the length it is is to mean that the longer is of the length ''it'' is. We should then have established a convention as to the meaning of the shorter, of the sort we are now to give. | ||
From this it results that "true" and "false" are not accidental properties of a proposition, such that, when it has meaning, we can say it is also true or false: on the contrary, to have meaning ''means '' to be true or false: the being true or false actually constitutes the relation of the proposition to reality, which we mean by saying that it has meaning (''Sinn'')''.'' | |||
There seems at first sight to be a certain ambiguity in what is meant by saying that a proposition is "true", owing to the fact that it seems as if, in the case of different propositions, the way in which they correspond to the facts to which they correspond is quite different. But what is really common to all cases is that they must have ''the general form of a proposition.'' In giving the general form of a proposition you are explaining what kind of ways of putting together the symbols of things and relations will correspond to (be analogous to) the things having those relations in reality. In doing thus you are saying what is meant by saying that a proposition is true; and you must do it once for all. To say "This proposition ''has sense''"'' ''means '"This proposition is true" means ... .' ("p" is true = "p" . p. Def. : only instead of "p" we must here introduce the general form of a proposition.)<ref>The reader should remember that according to Wittgenstein '"p"' is not a name but a description of the fact constituting the proposition. See above, p. 109. [''Edd''.]</ref> | |||
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