Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway: Difference between revisions

There seems at first sight to be a certain ambiguity in what is meant by saying that a proposition is "true", owing to the fact  that it seems  as if, in the case of different propositions, the way in which they correspond to the facts to which they correspond  is quite different.  But what is really common to all cases is that they must have ''the general form of a proposition.'' In giving the general  form  of a  proposition you are explaining what kind of ways of putting together the symbols of things and relations will correspond to (be analogous to) the things having those relations in reality. In doing thus you are saying what is meant by saying that a proposition is true; and you  must do it  once for all. To say "This proposition ''has sense''"'' ''means '"This proposition is true" means ... .' ("p" is true = "p" . p. Def. : only  instead of "p" we must here introduce the general form of a proposition.)<ref>The reader should remember that according to Wittgenstein '"p"' is not a name but a description of the fact constituting the proposition. See above, p. 109. [''Edd''.]</ref>

It seems at first sight as if the ab notation must be wrong, because it seems to treat true and false as on exactly the same level. It must be possible to see from the symbols themselves that there is some essential difference between the poles, if the notation is to be right; and it seems as if in fact this was impossible.

We describe a symbol, and say arbitrarily "A symbol of this description is a tautology". And then, it follows at once, both that any other symbol which answers to the same description is a tautology, and that any symbol which does ''not'' isn't. That is, we have arbitrarily fixed that any symbol of that description is to be a tautology; and this being fixed it is no longer arbitrary with regard to any other symbol whether it is a tautology or not.