Project:The copyright status of Wittgenstein’s works

By Michele Lavazza

... 2022

This essay in a nutshell: The copyright status of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s works is a more complicated matter than that of most other authors. This is largely because the greater part of his writings was published posthumously, with the intervention of different editors, by different publishers, in different countries. The purpose of this essay is to dispel some common misconceptions about copyright in general, to describe the rules that apply to Wittgenstein’s literary legacy and to clarify the current copyright status of his writings.

Introduction. The purpose of copyright and the public domain

Before starting to talk about Wittgenstein and his writings, it is important to briefly discuss the purpose of copyright and the general logic of it. This will help us gain a better understanding of the ethics behind the laws and make sense of what copyright is and is not.

Copyright aims to ensure that anyone who performs a creative effort and gives birth to a creative work controls the reproduction and dissemination of such work. Others do not, by default, have the right to copy it – hence the term – without the author’s permission, which is usually granted for a fee. This, in turn, ensures that artists and intellectuals have at least a chance at making a living out of their creative labour.

The concept of “copyright” relies on the obvious understanding that intellectual property is unlike other forms of property in that breaching it – “stealing” – does not mean that the original owner ceases to be in possession of their work. Copies can be made of books, pictures, recordings, etc. that leave the originals intact, whereas stealing gold or cattle means taking it away from someone. “Owning” a book as its author does, for example, as opposed to owning an individual specimen as a reader may, means having legal control over what can and cannot be done with it; “stealing” a book means doing things with it that the author has not agreed to, and this goes way beyond shoplifting an individual specimen.

Thus, the aim of copyright is, among other things, to make creativity viable on the market by giving authors monopoly over the distribution of the copies of their works. By being the only authorised sellers of those works, albeit often with the intermediation of a publisher, or a label, etc., authors may be able to secure an income.

The difference between intellectual property and the property of material goods, however, has implications that reach beyond the relative ease of breaching the former compared to breaching the latter. The very power of culture consists, in fact, in the possibility for words, pictures, music, etc. to be reproduced with relatively little effort and, most importantly, without thereby consuming, diminishing, or getting any closer to the depletion of the “source”. As the saying – often misattributed to George Bernard Shaw – goes: “If you have an apple and I have an apple and we exchange apples then you and I will still each have one apple. But if you have an idea and I have an idea and we exchange these ideas, then each of us will have two ideas”.

The benefit that society as a whole gains from the exchange and the transmission of ideas has long been clear. Therefore, a limitation always accompanies the affirmation of the author’s rights over their works: eventually, copyright expires, and the works become public property. Unlike a house, then, which can be handed over from parents to children by way of inheritance for, in principle, endless generations, the intellectual property of a creative work expires two to three generations after the author’s death, depending on the country or territory.

The rationale for the finite duration of the copyright term is related precisely to the concept, firstly, that the circulation of ideas by way of replicating works of art (and fiction, and nonfiction…) is in the interest of the human community, and not only in the interest of the author and their heirs; and, secondly, that if such circulation is free not only in the sense of freedom, but also in that of gratuity, the interest of the human spirit will be much better served.

The logic of copyright and of its term being limited by design, thus, is as follows. Authors should be able to exploit their works financially (in order perhaps, depending on one’s broader moral view, to reward their genius, but also to enable them to keep doing what they do while letting others benefit from their creativity as well). Sooner or later, however, the circulation of such works should stop being subject to the author’s consent or their family’s (in order for the public to fully enjoy the works without limitations of sorts, and especially without having to pay to do so).

In other words, the “spirit” of copyright law is that:

• upon the birth of a piece of creative work, the right to copy it, distribute the copies, sell them, modify the original and disseminate the modified version (a translation, a remix, etc.) belongs exclusively to the author – all rights are reserved;
• when the author dies, the abovementioned rights belong, equally exclusively, to the author’s legal heirs for a period of time that, generally speaking, may vary from 30 to 100 years (but is usually 50 or 70);
• then, when the copyright term expires, the work enters the public domain, which means that anyone is legally entitled to copy, distribute, sell, modify the work; those who were previously the exclusive holders of the rights are not entitled to any privilege any longer and have, in fact, the same status as all other members of the public; no rights are reserved, except for, in some cases, the few “soft” provisions we call “moral rights” (see below, § Contracts, and constraints unrelated to intellectual property).

The public domain is meant to be a guarantee that culture is not forever subject to the monetary laws of buying and selling. In spite of local differences in copyright legislation, it is remarkable that in every last country on Earth the copyright term is finite, and all jurisdictions share the moral understanding that it is right for the public to eventually be free to do anything they want with a piece of writing, of music, of visual art, etc.

The public domain is as important a feature of intellectual property laws as copyright. Attempts at restricting the public’s right to access and use works that are in the public domain should be considered as illegal as accessing and using copyrighted material without permission. Of course, it is much mor common for publishers to sue for copyright infringement than for individuals or non-for-profits to sue for what we could call “public domain infringement”. This is due to an obvious imbalance in power, that is, financial resources, knowledge, and organisation, but the argument is not any less urgent for this reason.

A very short history of the rights on Wittgenstein’s writings

Ludwig Wittgenstein died on 29 April 1951. In his las will and testament, he appointed G.E.M. Anscombe, R. Rhees and G.H. von Wright as his literary heirs. It is them, thus, who became the copyright holders for Wittgenstein’s writings.

In the second half of the 20th century, it was them who made (or sometimes delegated) decisions about what to publish and how and it was them who had a right to receive royalties for the sales of books.

Rhees died in 1989, Anscombe in 2001, and Von Wright in 2003. Although we were unable to find a detailed account of their wills and testaments, it is clear that, after their deaths, the copyright holders for Wittgenstein’s writings were The Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge. This leads us to think that it was Rhees’s, Anscombe’s, and Von Wright’s joint will to elect Trinity as the heir to the intellectual property of Wittgenstein’s writings.

29 April 2021 was the 70th anniversary of Wittgenstein’s death and on 1 January 2022 Wittgenstein’s Writings entered the public domain in countries where the copyright term is 70 years P.M.A. (post mortem auctoris, i.e., “after the author’s death”). This includes the European Union, most of Africa, Asia and Oceania, most Latin American Countries and Canada. In some countries, for example the United States, some of Wittgenstein’s works are still copyrighted. There, it is still Trinity who counts as the copyright holder.

In the next few sections, we will examine from the point of view of copyright: the relationship between Wittgenstein’s handwritten or typewritten originals and transcriptions, curated editions, and translations; the relevance, or lack thereof, of the ownership of the material papers to intellectual property; the complications of international copyright law in the age of the internet; the copyright status of individual published works by Ludwig Wittgenstein.

The stratification of copyright

It may happen that creative works become themselves the basis for other creative works. When a text is translated, for example, both the original and the translation count as creative works; when a statue or a building are photographed, both the three-dimensional object and the two-dimensional image count as creative works; etc.

It is important to understand how layers of copyright function in this kind of scenario, particularly because of how important the issue of transcriptions and translations is for the future of Wittgenstein studies.

The general rule here is quite simple. Obviously, both the creative work which is the starting point of a creative effort (as its material or its subject) and the creative work which is the output of such effort are copyrighted.

In the case of a translation of a book the author of which is still alive, for example, the author is the original text’s copyright holder and may licence another party, typically a publisher, to sell a translation; the translator will be the translations copyright holder and may in turn licence another party, again the publisher, to sell the translation. The publisher of the translation will need to have agreements with, and usually pay, both the author and the translator.

When copyright on the original text expires, it becomes possible for anyone to translate it and publish the translation without having to ask for permission. However, extant translations are still copyrighted until their copyright expires. For example, even though Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is now in the public domain both in Europe and in the United States, the Pears-McGuinness translation will be copyrighted in Europe until the 70 years P.M.A. term expires for both Pears and McGuinness, that is, 1 January 2080, for Pears passed before McGuinness and McGuinness passed in 2019. On the other hand, since F.P. Ramsey died at a very young age, many years before Wittgenstein himself, his translation entered the public domain in Europe when the original did.

Since, most often, the translator belongs to a younger generation than the author, “canonical” translations usually enter the public domain significantly later than the corresponding originals.

It must be stressed, however, that for a new “layer” of copyright to be born a creative effort must be involved.

We said, in the first paragraph, that copyright protects creative works as opposed to mere mechanical labour. This is also true when we talk about a creative work being the subject or the material for another creative work. For example, the photograph of a three-dimensional object is universally considered a creative work, because of the choices that need to be made in terms of angle, framing, composition, lighting, focus, focal length, shutter speed, aperture, etc. Even though the Nike of Samothrace is clearly in the public domain, each of the photographs of it that are created daily are protected by copyright.

On the other hand, photocopies and scans are universally considered to be purely mechanical reproductions of two-dimensional objects, and therefore do not entail the formation of a new layer of copyright. This is true even for faithful, frontal photographs of paintings or other two-dimensional works of art. The example here will be much more relevant: since the original handwritten and typescript notes taken by Wittgenstein are now in the public domain in Europe, the scans that are available on Wittgenstein Source are now in the public domain too. No matter how expensive or time-consuming scanning thousands of pages was, such effort was not of a creative nature, and copyright laws do not cover its output.

A verbatim transcription configures the same scenario. As no creativity is involved, for example, an HTML document that reproduces the text and the formatting of one of Wittgenstein’s manuscripts is not of itself eligible for copyright protection and is in the public domain if the original is. In the context of Wittgenstein studies, the case of the Wittgenstein Archives Bergen’s transcription of the Nachlass must be discussed explicitly. Under the direction of Profs Claus Huitfeldt and Alois Pichler and over more than 30 years, the WAB has rendered the scholarly community an invaluable service by providing excellent, extremely rich transcriptions of Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts that, at the moment of this writing, can be accessed online at no cost. The XML files created by the WAB include all the information which the originals themselves contain – emphases, strikeouts, alternatives, sidenotes, page breaks, and much more – and make it possible for the user to select which information set should be dynamically displayed. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of this resource, and the generosity behind the decision – by Trinity and the WAB – of making it available on the internet for free should be duly stressed. The effort that went into making and proofreading the transcriptions should also be recognised. However, this effort cannot count as a creative one. A transcription, even or rather especially a rich transcription that reproduces all the features of a handwritten or typewritten document, is a 1-to-1 substitution of some visual feature with the corresponding XML tag. If multiple people were to transcribe the same text, the output would have to be absolutely identical: this is enough reason to consider the activity as a non-creative activity. The same argument, however, can perhaps be expressed in an even more striking way: once a handwritten or typewritten paper original is transcribed into a rich text document whose markup incorporates all the information that was present in the original itself, this can (and must, for this is the whole point of the procedure) then be rendered as a document, for example a web page, that visually reproduces all the features of the original; in other words, the visual features of the text (emphases, additions, deletions, etc.) can be transformed into markup and markup can be transformed back into visual features; to put it in a very Wittgensteinian way, the original and the transcription have the same “mathematical multiplicity”, they are in a strong sense interchangeable, and the latter does not add anything creative to the former, no matter how painstakingly long and accurate the procedure is. (Within the frame of this argument, it also becomes even clearer why translations, on the other hand, are and should be considered creative works: there is no way a translation can be “translated back” into the original text: if one tried to reconstruct the German text of the Tractatus by translating an English version back into German, the result would obviously be very different than the actual original.)

From the point of view of Wittgenstein scholarship, the issue of copyright layers is particularly thorny when it comes to assessing the impact of the editors’ work on the very authorship of a published book. In those cases where the editors’ intervention was very significant in selecting and sorting Wittgenstein’s remarks while preparing them for publication, the editors may have to be considered co-authors, thereby extending the copyright term on a work beyond the 70-year period after Wittgenstein’s death. Given the uncertainty of this matter, the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project opted for a cautious approach, which is presented in a separate essay.

Contracts, politeness, and constraints unrelated to intellectual property

When a person is the holder of the copyright on a given work (because they are the author or because they are the author’s heir), they have the right to sign contracts that give others permission to use the work in specific ways under specific conditions. Typically, an author will sign an agreement with a publisher in order for the latter to print, distribute and sell the book and for the former to receive a sum of money in exchange – often a royalty, i.e., a percentage of the cover price of the copies sold.

Regardless of the agreements that copyright holders and publishers may have, however, the expiry of the copyright term is always a sufficient condition for the work to be in the public domain. No contract has the power to extend copyright protection beyond the term defined by the local legislation.

This, as well as the general nature of the public domain itself, is sometimes the subject of misunderstandings because publishers tend to print the copyright symbol “©” or another copyright notice on all books they produce, regardless of the copyright status of the text, possibly hoping to protect the typesetting and layout (which, however, are usually below the threshold of originality), or perhaps simply trying to discourage photocopying even public domain texts. As I mentioned above (§ Introduction. The purpose of copyright and the public domain), however, adding copyright symbols where they do not belong should be regarded as illegal.

Other restrictions related to copying may apply that sometimes make the picture more complicated.

One such restriction is what we call “moral rights”. Moral rights have to do with the author’s dignity as such and with their unique relationship with their work. The definition of moral rights also varies across jurisdictions, but most often they include the right of attribution and the prohibition that works be remixed in a way that negatively affects the author, their image, or their reputation. This wording may seem to forbid adding a moustache to a reproduction of Mona Lisa or creating a horror version of Winnie the Pooh, but in practice such things are widely accepted, as long as it’s clear that the parody or distortion is attributable to the remixer, and not to the author. Moral rights have no import as far as copyright and the public domain are concerned, and no financial import whatsoever. In some countries, they do not expire.

Another set of restrictions may arise from the fact that, even after copyright expires, ownership of the original specimen remains. Thus, for example, the Louvre may well forbid visitors to take photos of pictures – even though most of the works in the museum are out of copyright – simply because they have the authority to dictate the house rules; on the other hand, they have no authority to forbid us to freely share, modify and even sell faithful reproductions of two-dimensional works. In the case of Wittgenstein, his originals have several different owners – the Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge; the Austrian National Library, Vienna; the Bodleian Library, Oxford; the Noord Hollands Archief, Haarlem; the Bertrand Russell Archives, McMaster University Library, Hamilton – but this also has no import as far as copyright and the public domain are concerned.

Finally, even in the arid landscape of copyright law and harsh arena of the publishing business, politeness and bona fides are not without importance. It remains a good practice to inform the former copyright holders or the owners of the originals when a new edition or translation of a public-domain text is planned; and it is crucial that projects which share the same goal of improving the availability of a given cultural asset to the public are well coordinated, do not uselessly compete with each other, and on the contrary work together in a spirit of cooperation and, at least, complementarity. This is as good a place as any to say that if the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project failed to comply with these basic rules of manners it was not because of a slapdash attitude, but because of a failure to identify some of the many stakeholders.

Copyright in the age of the internet

It was mentioned above that breaching intellectual property rules is somewhat easier than breaching regular property rules, at least insofar as the “stolen” object is not taken away from the owner and it may even be difficult for them to realise that they have been robbed.

Computers and the internet have made copying creative works and distributing them easier than ever before. They have, therefore, multiplied the instances of copyright infringement. (As a side note, it should be remarked that they have also multiplied the instances of lawful distribution of copyrighted material for a fee, thereby significantly enriching the publishers that have taken advantage of the newer media.)

Copyright law has changed remarkably little to meet the challenges of the digital age. The most significant innovation in the landscape of copyright law since the beginning of the 21st century has been the codification and the spread of Creative Commons licences, which will be briefly discussed below, in § The Creative Commons licences. Other than that, the world’s copyright system is not designed for the digital age, and often seems to be altogether unfit for it.

One of the challenges for those who are looking to lawfully share out-of-copyright content in a digital format is the fact that the web is an intrinsically international space – it is, after all, the worldwide web – and within it national borders are almost non-existent.

As far as copyright is concerned, international relations are still largely regulated by the Berne Convention, adopted in 1886 and last amended in 1979. This document establishes that signatory countries must grant copyright protection to all works that have another signatory country as their country of origin.

Now, because copyright rules are very much country-specific, it is common for a work to be copyrighted according to the laws of a given country and in the public domain according to the laws of another. For example, Soldier’s Pay, William Faulkner’s first novel, published in 1926, is in the public domain in the US, where everything that was published before 1927 is now out of copyright; it is, however, copyrighted in the European Union, because Faulkner died in 1962 and the EU’s copyright term lasts 70 years after the author’s death. For the same reason, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus was already in the public domain in the US in 2021, when it was still copyrighted in the European Union.

What does it mean, then, to lawfully share out-of-copyright content on the web? Should we wait until the content is out of copyright according to the laws of every last country on Earth? This would clash with the principle, stated above, that the public’s right to access public domain works should not be limited beyond what a given legislation already does. Should we consider it enough for the copyright term to have expired in the country where the website is based, even though the location of the servers or the legal registration may be immaterial as far as the location of the audience is concerned? This would expose the site to the risk of being considered a pirate website, and therefore being blocked, in counties that have a longer copyright term.

There is no definite answer to this question, precisely because there is no international treaty with provisions that take into account the contemporary state of information technology. A viable solution, however, is that of respecting two requirements while publishing works on the internet: for them to be free in the country where the site is located and in their country of origin.

This is, for example, the policy of Wikimedia projects, which have earned a very respectable position among those who are trying to challenge the traditional closed culture system while abiding by its rules.

The notion of “country of origin” is a traditional concept that is defined by the Berne Convention itself. Even though its application is not always obvious when a work is first published in a digital format, for it may then be considered to be simultaneously published throughout the world, determining the country of origin of a work that was first published in print is rather straightforward.

Under the Convention, determining the country of origin of a published work is simply a matter of ascertaining where that work was first published or simultaneously published. The rules provide that for works first published in a country of the Union, the country of origin will be that country. For works published simultaneously in several countries of the Union which grant different terms of protection, the country of origin will be the country with the shortest term of protection […]

The question should then be answered: what does it mean for a website to be located in a certain country? The question is rather complex for high-traffic sites which, to better serve requests, have serves in many locations and for sites which are operated by multinational companies; it is, however, quite simple in the case of the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project, since our servers are located in Italy and the owner of the website is both Italian and based in Italy. The Ludwig Wittgenstein Project therefore operates under Italian laws and European Union regulations.

Finally, it should be noted that the policy according to which the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project only publishes works that are free in their country of origin and in Italy, in spite of adhering to a widely accepted best practice, does not of itself solve the problem posed by the fact that some of the texts that are available on our site are not in the public domain in some countries, for example the United States. It is the reader’s responsibility to comply with the laws of their country by making sure that a given work is in the public domain there before accessing it or downloading it. Still, nothing would prevent a country where some of the materials that we publish are not in the public domain, for example the US, from blocking access to our site for users located within its territory.

The Creative Commons licences

Before moving on, it is now appropriate to provide a very short introduction to Creative Commons Licences. This is for three reasons:

• as was claimed in the previous section of this essay, they are probably the most meaningful innovation in the field of intellectual property since the advent of the internet;
• as we will see in the last section of this essay (see § The copyright status of Wittgenstein’s individual works), some of Wittgenstein’s works have been released by their copyright holders under the terms of Creative Commons licences;
• the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project releases all its original content under Creative Commons licences.

Creative Commons licences provide a simple solution for creators to publish their works under terms that, on the one hand, allow others to use them for free and, on the other hand, require the party who uses the content to meet a variable set of conditions, based on the creator’s own choice. Their introduction was prompted by the realisation that, with the advent of the internet, an increasing number of people would be happy to publish their creative works outside of a commercial logic, i.e., without the hope or even the intention of making money out of their sale, but would still want to reserve some rights.

Devised by a team of legal experts led by Lawrence Lessig and first released in 2002, the six Creative Commons licences are based on the recognition of three freedoms and four constraints. The three freedoms are:

• the right to share a work, meaning to duplicate it, republish it, distribute it;
• the right to remix a work, that is, to edit a picture, translate a text, remix an audio track in the strict sense or otherwise create a derivative work based upon the original;
• the right to sell a work, that is to use the original or a work derived from the original commercially.

The four constraints are:

• the duty to attribute the work, that is, to cite the author or authors;
• the duty to share derivative works, if any, under the same licence as the original;
• the prohibition to sell the work or a work derived from it, or otherwise use it commercially;
• the prohibition to remix the work, meaning that no works can be derived from it.

The combinations of these freedoms and constraints generate the six licences, listed below in order from the “most free” to the “least free”

• Creative Commons Zero (CC0): a waiver equivalent to the public domain, where the author grants permission to use the work for all purposes without any limitations, not even requiring attribution; it should be noted that CC0 is not a licence in a strict sense, but is rather referred to as a “tool” for relinquishing one’s rights;
• Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY): the work can be used for all purposes, but the author must be credited;
• Creative Commons Attribution – ShareAlike (CC BY-SA): the work can be used for all purposes, but the author must be credited and derivative works, if any, must also be licenced under CC BY-SA;
• Creative Commons Attribution – NonCommercial (CC BY-NC): the work can be used for non-commercial purposes; the author must be credited;
• Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike (CC BY-NC-SA): the work can be used for non-commercial purposes; the author must be credited and derivative works, if any, must also be licenced under CC BY-NC-SA.
• Attribution-NoDerivatives (CC BY-ND): the work can be used for all purposes, but it cannot be remixed; the author must be credited;
• Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC BY-NC-ND): the work can be used for non-commercial purposes, but it cannot be remixed; the author must be credited.

The copyright status of Wittgenstein’s individual works

In this section, we will apply the concepts described above in order to clarify the copyright status of Wittgenstein’s works. We will limit ourselves to those that have been published on the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project’s website or might be in the short-to-medium term, thereby excluding those texts where the editors may have to be counted as co-authors.

For each work, the copyright status in the country of origin and in Italy will be described and explained. Occasionally, the copyright status in the United States will be discussed, as the US, despite not playing a special role from the point of view of the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project, are certainly the centre of gravity of the web.

The information is valid and up to date in 2022. Copyright that is still standing will gradually expire in the coming years and decades.

Review of P. Coffey, “The Science of Logic”

The Review of P. Coffey, “The Science of Logic” was first published in the UK by the English journal The Cambridge Review, vol. 34, no. 853, 6 Mar. 1913, p. 351.

Its country of origin is the United Kingdom. This work is in the public domain there because the copyright term for literary works in the UK is 70 years P.M.A.[14] and the author died before 1952.

This work is in the public domain in Italy because the copyright term for literary works in Italy is 70 years P.M.A. and the author died before 1952.

Additionally, it is in the public domain in the United States because it was published in 1913 and everything that was published before 1 January 1927 is now in the public domain in the US.

Tagebücher 1914-1916

The Tagebücher 1914-1916 were first published in Germany in the volume Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Tagebücher 1914-1916. Philosophische Untersuchungen, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1960, pp. 85-278.

Their country of origin is Germany. This work is in the public domain there, as well as in Italy, because the copyright term for literary works there is 70 years P.M.A. and the author died before 1952.

Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung

The Logisch-philosophische Abhanlung was first published in Germany in the journal Annalen der Naturphilosophie, no. 14, 1921, pp. 185-262.

Their country of origin is Germany. This work is in the public domain there, as well as in Italy, because the copyright term for literary works there is 70 years P.M.A. and the author died before 1952.

Additionally, it is in the public domain in the United States because it was published in 1921 and everything that was published before 1 January 1927 is now in the public domain in the US.

Wörterbuch für Volks- und Bürgerschulen

The Wörterbuch für Volks- und Bürgerschulen was first published in Austria as Wörterbuch für Volks- und Bürgerschulen, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Wien 1926.

Its country of origin is Austria. This work is in the public domain there, as well as in Italy, because the copyright term for literary works there is 70 years P.M.A. and the author died before 1952.

Additionally, it is in the public domain in the United States because it was published in 1926 and everything that was published before 1 January 1927 is now in the public domain in the US.

[Prefazione??]

Bemerkungen über Frazers “The Golden Bough”

Synthese 1967 (Dordrecht)

Philosophische Untersuchungen

Blackwell, Oxford, 1953

Zettel

Blackwell, Oxford, 1967

Bemerkungen über die Farben

Remarks on Colour / Bemerkungen über die Farben. Hg. von G. E. M.

Anscombe, übersetzt von Linda L. McAlister und Margarete Schättle.

Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1977. [Deutsch mit englischer Übersetzung]

Über Gewißheit

Blackwell 1969

Notes on Logic

The Notes on Logic were first published in the United States of America, in the journal The Journal of Philosophy, 54, 1957, pp. 230–245.

Its country of origin is the US. In order to determine the copyright status of a work which has the US as its country of origin, knowledge of the date of the author’s death is not sufficient. Per the Hirtle Chart [link], the current copyright status of a work first published in the US between 1927 and 1964 depends on whether or not it was published with a copyright notice (which we should assume was the case) and, if it was, on whether or not copyright was renewed before its expiry, the term of which was then 28 years: if copyright was renewed, the text is still copyrighted in the U.S.; if it wasn’t, the text is now in the public domain in the US. Although a relatively small percentage of the works from this period had their copyright renewed with the US copyright office, it should not be assumed that this issue of the Journal of Philosophy was not. In order to determine until what date the text will be copyrighted, it would be necessary to know the details of the renewal; in what would be a worst case scenario from the point of view of free culture, the date would be calculated as follows: the text was published in 1957 and copyright was renewed at the latest possible moment before expiry, i.e., in 1957 + 28 = 1985; the second term, in 1985, had a duration of 47 years, meaning that it will expire in 1985 + 47 = 2032 and the text will enter the public domain in the US on 1 January 2033.

However, in February 2017 the text of Wittgenstein’s Ts-201a1 and Ts-201a2 were released by the copyright holders – The Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge; Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University Library, Hamilton, Ontario; University of Bergen, Bergen – under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence. Therefore, the text should be regarded as being in the public domain in countries where the copyright term is 70 years P.M.A. and licenced under CC BY-NC 4.0 International in the US. As was discussed above in this essay (see § Copyright in the age of the internet), a work being in the public domain in its country of origin is not a requirement for it to be freely reusable, remixable etc. elsewhere, but rather a generally accepted good practice when the work is to be published on the internet; because of the internet’s lack of national boundaries, that is, we consider it a good compromise to always make sure that we abide by the rules both of a work’s country of origin and of the country where the work is used, remixed, etc. The situation is similar when a work is not in the public domain in its country of origin but rather is licenced under the terms of a non-free Creative Commons licence such as CC BY-NC: we always want to abide by the rules both of a work’s country of origin and of the country where the work is used, remixed, etc. In this case, this means treating the work (Wittgenstein’s original text) as though it was also licenced under CC BY-NC in Italy. Now, CC BY-NC does not prohibit derivative works (for it does not include the “ND”, “NoDerivs” clause), nor does it require derivative works to be licenced under the same terms (for it does not include the “SA”, “ShareAlike” clause). Therefore, the LWP’s translations have been published under CC BY-SA.

Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway

„Aufzeichnungen, die G. E. Moore in Norwegen nach Diktat niederge-

schrieben hat“. Hg. von G. E. M. Anscombe und G. H. von Wright, übersetzt

von Günther Patzig und Eberhard Bubser. In: Schriften Bd. 1, S. 226–253.

Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1960. [Englisch mit deutscher Übersetzung]

Some Remarks on Logical Form

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Oxford 1969

Lecture on Ethics

The Lecture on Ethics was first published in the United States of America, in the journal The Philosophical Review, vol. 74, no. 1, Jan. 1965, pp. 3–12.

Its country of origin is the US.

However, in February 2017 the text of Wittgenstein’s Ts-207 was released by the copyright holders – The Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge and the University of Bergen, Bergen – under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence. Therefore, the text should be regarded as being in the public domain in countries where the copyright term is 70 years PMA and licenced under CC BY-NC 4.0 International in the US. See above, § Notes on Logic, for more details.

Blue Book

Blackwell 1958

Brown Book

Blackwell 1958

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[14] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/copyright-notice-duration-of-copyright-term/copyright-notice-duration-of-copyright-term