Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway: Difference between revisions

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N.B. "x" can't be the name of this actual scratch y, because this isn't a thing: but it can be the name of ''a thing''; and we must understand that what we are doing is to explain what would be meant by saying of an ideal symbol, which did actually consist in one ''thing's'' being to the left of another, that in it a ''thing'' symbolized.
N.B. "x" can't be the name of this actual scratch y, because this isn't a thing: but it can be the name of ''a thing''; and we must understand that what we are doing is to explain what would be meant by saying of an ideal symbol, which did actually consist in one ''thing's'' being to the left of another, that in it a ''thing'' symbolized.


(N.B. In [the] expression (∃y). ''φ''y, one ''is'' apt to say this means "There is a ''thing'' such that...". But in fact we should say "There is a y, such that..."; the fact that the y symbolizes expressing what we mean.)
(N.B. In [the] expression (∃y) . ''φ''y, one ''is'' apt to say this means "There is a ''thing'' such that...". But in fact we should say "There is a y, such that..."; the fact that the y symbolizes expressing what we mean.)


In general: When such propositions are analysed, while the words "thing", "fact", etc. will disappear, there will appear instead of them a new symbol, of the same form as the one of which we are speaking; and hence it will be at once obvious that we ''cannot'' get the one kind of proposition from the other by substitution.
In general: When such propositions are analysed, while the words "thing", "fact", etc. will disappear, there will appear instead of them a new symbol, of the same form as the one of which we are speaking; and hence it will be at once obvious that we ''cannot'' get the one kind of proposition from the other by substitution.