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Before starting to talk about Wittgenstein and his writings, it is important to briefly discuss the purpose of copyright and its general logic. This will help us gain a better understanding of the ethics behind the laws and make sense of what copyright is and what it is not. | Before starting to talk about Wittgenstein and his writings, it is important to briefly discuss the purpose of copyright and its general logic. This will help us gain a better understanding of the ethics behind the laws and make sense of what copyright is and what it is not. | ||
Copyright aims to ensure that anyone who performs a creative effort and gives birth to a creative work controls the reproduction and dissemination of such work. Others do not, by default, have the right to copy | Copyright aims to ensure that anyone who performs a creative effort and gives birth to a creative work controls the reproduction and dissemination of such work. Others do not, by default, have the right to copy it—hence the term—without the author’s permission, which is usually granted for a fee. This, in turn, ensures that artists and intellectuals have at least a chance at making a living out of their creative labour. | ||
The concept of “copyright” relies on the understanding that intellectual property is unlike other forms of property in that breaching | The concept of “copyright” relies on the understanding that intellectual property is unlike other forms of property in that breaching it—“stealing”—does not mean that the original owner ceases to be in possession of their work. Copies can be made of books, pictures, recordings, etc. that leave the originals intact, whereas stealing gold or cattle means taking it away from someone. “Owning” a book as its author does, for example, as opposed to owning an individual specimen as a reader may, means having legal control over what can and cannot be done with it; “stealing” a book means doing things with it that the author has not agreed to, and this goes way beyond shoplifting an individual specimen. | ||
Thus, the aim of copyright is, among other things, to make creativity viable on the market by giving authors monopoly over the distribution of the copies of their works. By being the only authorised sellers of those works, albeit often with the intermediation of a publisher, or a label, etc., authors may be able to secure an income. | Thus, the aim of copyright is, among other things, to make creativity viable on the market by giving authors monopoly over the distribution of the copies of their works. By being the only authorised sellers of those works, albeit often with the intermediation of a publisher, or a label, etc., authors may be able to secure an income. | ||
The difference between intellectual property and the property of material goods, however, has implications that reach beyond the relative ease of breaching the former compared to breaching the latter. The very power of culture consists in the possibility for words, pictures, music, etc. to be reproduced with relatively little effort and, most importantly, ''without thereby consuming, diminishing, or getting any closer to the depletion of the “source”''. As the | The difference between intellectual property and the property of material goods, however, has implications that reach beyond the relative ease of breaching the former compared to breaching the latter. The very power of culture consists in the possibility for words, pictures, music, etc. to be reproduced with relatively little effort and, most importantly, ''without thereby consuming, diminishing, or getting any closer to the depletion of the “source”''. As the saying—often misattributed to George Bernard Shaw—goes: “If you have an apple and I have an apple and we exchange apples then you and I will still each have one apple. But if you have an idea and I have an idea and we exchange these ideas, then each of us will have two ideas”. The benefit that society as a whole gains from the exchange and the transmission of ideas has long been clear. Therefore, a limitation always accompanies the affirmation of the author’s rights over their works: eventually, copyright expires, and the works become public property. Unlike the property a house, then, which can be handed over from parents to children by way of inheritance for, in principle, endless generations, the intellectual property of a creative work expires two to three generations after the author’s death, depending on the country or territory. | ||
The rationale for the finite duration of the copyright term lies, firstly, in the concept that the circulation of ideas through the replication of works of art (and fiction, and nonfiction) is in the interest of the human community, and not only in the interest of the author and their heirs; and, secondly, it lies in the concept that if such circulation is free not only in the sense of “freedom”, but also in the sense of “free of cost”, the interest of the human spirit will be much better served. | The rationale for the finite duration of the copyright term lies, firstly, in the concept that the circulation of ideas through the replication of works of art (and fiction, and nonfiction) is in the interest of the human community, and not only in the interest of the author and their heirs; and, secondly, it lies in the concept that if such circulation is free not only in the sense of “freedom”, but also in the sense of “free of cost”, the interest of the human spirit will be much better served. | ||
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In other words, the “spirit” of copyright laws is that: | In other words, the “spirit” of copyright laws is that: | ||
* upon the birth<ref>Generally speaking, it is not necessary to publish or register a work, or to comply with any formalities at all, in order for it to be copyrighted. This, however, has not always been the case everywhere in the world: because for many decades in the 20th century US law required creative works to bear a copyright notice (for example the copyright symbol “©” followed by the publication date and the author’s name) in order for them to be copyrighted, many works that did not comply with this simple formality were directly, albeit often inadvertently, released in the public domain.</ref> of a piece of creative work, the right to copy it, distribute the copies, sell them, modify the original and disseminate the modified version (a translation, a remix, etc.) belongs exclusively to the | * upon the birth<ref>Generally speaking, it is not necessary to publish or register a work, or to comply with any formalities at all, in order for it to be copyrighted. This, however, has not always been the case everywhere in the world: because for many decades in the 20th century US law required creative works to bear a copyright notice (for example the copyright symbol “©” followed by the publication date and the author’s name) in order for them to be copyrighted, many works that did not comply with this simple formality were directly, albeit often inadvertently, released in the public domain.</ref> of a piece of creative work, the right to copy it, distribute the copies, sell them, modify the original and disseminate the modified version (a translation, a remix, etc.) belongs exclusively to the author—all rights are reserved; | ||
* when the author dies, the abovementioned rights belong, equally exclusively, to the author’s legal heirs for a period of time that, generally speaking, may vary from 30 to 100 years (but is usually 50 or 70); | * when the author dies, the abovementioned rights belong, equally exclusively, to the author’s legal heirs for a period of time that, generally speaking, may vary from 30 to 100 years (but is usually 50 or 70); | ||
* then, when the copyright term expires, the work enters the public domain, which means that anyone is legally entitled to copy it, distribute it, sell it, modify it; those who were previously the exclusive holders of the rights are not entitled to any privilege any longer and have, in fact, the same status as all other members of the public; no rights are reserved, except for, in some cases, the few “soft” provisions we call “moral rights” (see below, [[#Contracts, constraints unrelated to intellectual property, and politeness|§ Contracts, constraints unrelated to intellectual property, and politeness]]). | * then, when the copyright term expires, the work enters the public domain, which means that anyone is legally entitled to copy it, distribute it, sell it, modify it; those who were previously the exclusive holders of the rights are not entitled to any privilege any longer and have, in fact, the same status as all other members of the public; no rights are reserved, except for, in some cases, the few “soft” provisions we call “moral rights” (see below, [[#Contracts, constraints unrelated to intellectual property, and politeness|§ Contracts, constraints unrelated to intellectual property, and politeness]]). | ||
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The public domain is meant to be a guarantee that culture is not forever subject to the monetary laws of buying and selling. In spite of local differences in copyright legislation, it is remarkable that in every last country on Earth the copyright term is finite, and ''all'' jurisdictions share the moral understanding that it is right for the public to eventually be free to do anything they want with a piece of writing, music, visual art, etc. | The public domain is meant to be a guarantee that culture is not forever subject to the monetary laws of buying and selling. In spite of local differences in copyright legislation, it is remarkable that in every last country on Earth the copyright term is finite, and ''all'' jurisdictions share the moral understanding that it is right for the public to eventually be free to do anything they want with a piece of writing, music, visual art, etc. | ||
The public domain is as important a feature of intellectual property laws as copyright. Attempts at restricting the public’s right to access and use works that are in the public domain should be considered as illegal as accessing and using copyrighted material without permission. Of course, it is much more common for publishers to sue for copyright infringement than for individuals or non-for-profits to sue for what we could call “public domain infringement”. This is due to an obvious imbalance in | The public domain is as important a feature of intellectual property laws as copyright. Attempts at restricting the public’s right to access and use works that are in the public domain should be considered as illegal as accessing and using copyrighted material without permission. Of course, it is much more common for publishers to sue for copyright infringement than for individuals or non-for-profits to sue for what we could call “public domain infringement”. This is due to an obvious imbalance in power—that is, financial resources, knowledge, and organisation—but the argument is not any less urgent for this reason.<ref>The very concept of “public domain infringement”, obviously formed in analogy with “copyright infringement”, was coined by the author of this essay. Merely as a proof that the broad moral framework of our culture warrants the analogy, consider articles 27 (“Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”) and 19 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”) of the {{plainlink|[https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Universal_Declaration_of_Human_Rights Universal Declaration of Human Rights]}}.</ref> | ||
== A very short history of the rights on Wittgenstein’s writings == | == A very short history of the rights on Wittgenstein’s writings == | ||
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<div class="custom-mobile-only">[[File:World copyright-terms nokey.svg|thumb|center]] [[file:World copyright-terms key wide plain.svg|thumb|center]]</div> | <div class="custom-mobile-only">[[File:World copyright-terms nokey.svg|thumb|center]] [[file:World copyright-terms key wide plain.svg|thumb|center]]</div> | ||
<p style="text-align: center; color: #54595d;">This map provides a simplified overview of the duration of copyright terms worldwide. Please note that in some countries, for example the US, copyright laws are more complex than elsewhere and knowing that a given number of years has passed since an author’s death is not sufficient for determining the copyright status of their works; in the US, in particular, the publication date of a work often influences its copyright status.<ref name="hirtle-chart">See ''{{plainlink|[https://guides.library.cornell.edu/copyright/publicdomain Copyright Term and the Public Domain]}}'', Cornell University Library, retrieved 30 July 2022 ({{plainlink|[https://web.archive.org/web/20220711133814/https://guides.library.cornell.edu/copyright/publicdomain archived URL]}}).</ref> Moreover, even in those cases where a country’s copyright term is a definite period after the author’s death, exceptions may extend copyright further; in France, for example, where the duration of the copyright term is 70 years P.M.A., copyright lasts longer for those authors who died at war and officially count as ''morts pour la France'' | <p style="text-align: center; color: #54595d;">This map provides a simplified overview of the duration of copyright terms worldwide. Please note that in some countries, for example the US, copyright laws are more complex than elsewhere and knowing that a given number of years has passed since an author’s death is not sufficient for determining the copyright status of their works; in the US, in particular, the publication date of a work often influences its copyright status.<ref name="hirtle-chart">See ''{{plainlink|[https://guides.library.cornell.edu/copyright/publicdomain Copyright Term and the Public Domain]}}'', Cornell University Library, retrieved 30 July 2022 ({{plainlink|[https://web.archive.org/web/20220711133814/https://guides.library.cornell.edu/copyright/publicdomain archived URL]}}).</ref> Moreover, even in those cases where a country’s copyright term is a definite period after the author’s death, exceptions may extend copyright further; in France, for example, where the duration of the copyright term is 70 years P.M.A., copyright lasts longer for those authors who died at war and officially count as ''morts pour la France''—among them, famously, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry.<ref>See {{plainlink|[https://www.sne.fr/editeur-et-auteur/duree-des-droits-dauteurs/ Durée des droits d’auteur]}}, Syndicat national de l’édition, 2 Novembre 2017, retrieved 30 July 2022 ({{plainlink|[https://web.archive.org/web/20220730141446/https://www.sne.fr/editeur-et-auteur/duree-des-droits-dauteurs/ archived URL]}})</ref></p> | ||
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On the other hand, photocopies and scans are universally considered to be purely mechanical reproductions of two-dimensional objects, and therefore do not entail the formation of a new layer of copyright. This is also true for frontal photographs of paintings or other two-dimensional works of art. The example here will be much more relevant: since the original handwritten and typewritten notes taken or dictated by Wittgenstein are now in the public domain in most countries, the scans that are available on the {{plainlink|[http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/ Wittgenstein Source]}} website are now in the public domain too, at least in those countries where copyright expires 70 years or fewer P.M.A. No matter how expensive or time-consuming scanning thousands of pages was, such effort was not of a creative nature, it did not leave room for originality, and copyright laws do not cover its output.<ref>For further details on this subject, see Thomas Margoni, ''{{plainlink|[https://web.archive.org/web/20190512145439/http://outofcopyright.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/digitisation_cultural_heritage-thomas-margoni.pdf The digitisation of cultural heritage: originality, derivative works and (non) original photographs]}}'', Institute for Information Law (IViR), Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam, p. 51.</ref> | On the other hand, photocopies and scans are universally considered to be purely mechanical reproductions of two-dimensional objects, and therefore do not entail the formation of a new layer of copyright. This is also true for frontal photographs of paintings or other two-dimensional works of art. The example here will be much more relevant: since the original handwritten and typewritten notes taken or dictated by Wittgenstein are now in the public domain in most countries, the scans that are available on the {{plainlink|[http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/ Wittgenstein Source]}} website are now in the public domain too, at least in those countries where copyright expires 70 years or fewer P.M.A. No matter how expensive or time-consuming scanning thousands of pages was, such effort was not of a creative nature, it did not leave room for originality, and copyright laws do not cover its output.<ref>For further details on this subject, see Thomas Margoni, ''{{plainlink|[https://web.archive.org/web/20190512145439/http://outofcopyright.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/digitisation_cultural_heritage-thomas-margoni.pdf The digitisation of cultural heritage: originality, derivative works and (non) original photographs]}}'', Institute for Information Law (IViR), Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam, p. 51.</ref> | ||
The same is true for verbatim transcriptions. These are also considered “mechanical”, not in the sense that a machine should be able to carry out the same job as the human transcriber, but in the sense that they are thoroughly faithful reproductions of the text in the abstract sense of the | The same is true for verbatim transcriptions. These are also considered “mechanical”, not in the sense that a machine should be able to carry out the same job as the human transcriber, but in the sense that they are thoroughly faithful reproductions of the text in the abstract sense of the term—i.e., the sequence of characters (letters, numbers, punctuation marks, special characters) with their formatting. | ||
Let us produce an example. In summer 2022, thanks to Prof Sacha Raoult’s kind intervention and helpful mediation, the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project received permission from the Directors of the Centre Gilles-Gaston Granger at the Aix-Marseille Université to publish a web edition of Granger’s French translation of the ''Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus''. During the autumn and winter of the same year, the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project’s volunteers scanned a paper edition of the book and, with a combination of OCR, manual transcribing, and proofreading, they generated the MediaWiki source code for the text, which is used by the websites’s parser to generate the page’s HMTL “on the fly”; the latter, in turn, is rendered visually by web browsers. The procedure was neither easy nor simple, and it was very time-consuming; it required knowledge of the French language, understanding of MediaWiki and HMTL markup, familiarity with the logical and mathematical notation used by Wittgenstein and with the LaTeX syntax for writing and typesetting the formulae. However, this process cannot be regarded as original or creative, because it is a verbatim transcription, that is, a 1-to-1 substitution of some character or formatting feature with a corresponding character or XML tag. (The fact that, in MediaWiki syntax, XML tags are mostly replaced by other markup conventions is of no import, because that too is a 1-to-1 substitution.) Particularly in the case of the transcription of a print edition, where there is no issue of interpreting potentially ambiguous handwriting, if multiple people were to transcribe the same text, the output would have to be absolutely identical: the output, in other words, is process-agnostic, and this is enough reason to consider the transcriber’s activity as a non-creative activity. No new layer of copyright is generated by the process. In the case of Granger’s translation of the ''Tractatus'', the copyright owners gave the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project permission to publish its digital edition, but the French texts stays copyrighted and all rights on it remain reserved; however, when the copyright term will expire on Granger’s translation, the digital edition will be in the public domain too, regarless of how long the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project volunteers will live. A verbatim transcription is not of itself eligible for copyright protection and is in the public domain if the original is. | Let us produce an example. In summer 2022, thanks to Prof Sacha Raoult’s kind intervention and helpful mediation, the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project received permission from the Directors of the Centre Gilles-Gaston Granger at the Aix-Marseille Université to publish a web edition of Granger’s French translation of the ''Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus''. During the autumn and winter of the same year, the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project’s volunteers scanned a paper edition of the book and, with a combination of OCR, manual transcribing, and proofreading, they generated the MediaWiki source code for the text, which is used by the websites’s parser to generate the page’s HMTL “on the fly”; the latter, in turn, is rendered visually by web browsers. The procedure was neither easy nor simple, and it was very time-consuming; it required knowledge of the French language, understanding of MediaWiki and HMTL markup, familiarity with the logical and mathematical notation used by Wittgenstein and with the LaTeX syntax for writing and typesetting the formulae. However, this process cannot be regarded as original or creative, because it is a verbatim transcription, that is, a 1-to-1 substitution of some character or formatting feature with a corresponding character or XML tag. (The fact that, in MediaWiki syntax, XML tags are mostly replaced by other markup conventions is of no import, because that too is a 1-to-1 substitution.) Particularly in the case of the transcription of a print edition, where there is no issue of interpreting potentially ambiguous handwriting, if multiple people were to transcribe the same text, the output would have to be absolutely identical: the output, in other words, is process-agnostic, and this is enough reason to consider the transcriber’s activity as a non-creative activity. No new layer of copyright is generated by the process. In the case of Granger’s translation of the ''Tractatus'', the copyright owners gave the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project permission to publish its digital edition, but the French texts stays copyrighted and all rights on it remain reserved; however, when the copyright term will expire on Granger’s translation, the digital edition will be in the public domain too, regarless of how long the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project volunteers will live. A verbatim transcription is not of itself eligible for copyright protection and is in the public domain if the original is. | ||
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For transcriptions of handwritten materials which set themselves a goal that goes beyond providing a digital version of the text, different conclusions may have to be drawn because different hypotheses may have to be taken into account. In the context of Wittgenstein studies, the case of the {{plainlink|[http://wab.uib.no/index.page Wittgenstein Archives Bergen]}}’s <span class="plainlinks">[http://wab.uib.no/transform/wab.php?modus=opsjoner transcriptions of the ''Nachlass'']</span> must now be discussed explicitly.<ref>Of course, the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project has no intention to duplicate the WAB’s excellent work and even less to attempt to overshadow it. The scope of our project is, and is meant to be, complementary to theirs, in that we aim to make edited ''Leseausgaben'' available as opposed to “raw” source materials and our target audience is the general public as opposed to the academics. Se the following section, [[#Contracts, constraints unrelated to intellectual property, and politeness|§ Contracts, constraints unrelated to intellectual property, and politeness]], for a brief comment on “politeness” in this context.</ref> | For transcriptions of handwritten materials which set themselves a goal that goes beyond providing a digital version of the text, different conclusions may have to be drawn because different hypotheses may have to be taken into account. In the context of Wittgenstein studies, the case of the {{plainlink|[http://wab.uib.no/index.page Wittgenstein Archives Bergen]}}’s <span class="plainlinks">[http://wab.uib.no/transform/wab.php?modus=opsjoner transcriptions of the ''Nachlass'']</span> must now be discussed explicitly.<ref>Of course, the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project has no intention to duplicate the WAB’s excellent work and even less to attempt to overshadow it. The scope of our project is, and is meant to be, complementary to theirs, in that we aim to make edited ''Leseausgaben'' available as opposed to “raw” source materials and our target audience is the general public as opposed to the academics. Se the following section, [[#Contracts, constraints unrelated to intellectual property, and politeness|§ Contracts, constraints unrelated to intellectual property, and politeness]], for a brief comment on “politeness” in this context.</ref> | ||
Under the direction of Profs Claus Huitfeldt and Alois Pichler and over more than 30 years, the WAB has rendered the scholarly community an invaluable service by providing excellent, extremely rich transcriptions of Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts that, at the moment of this writing, can be accessed online at no cost. The XML files created by the WAB include all the information which the originals themselves | Under the direction of Profs Claus Huitfeldt and Alois Pichler and over more than 30 years, the WAB has rendered the scholarly community an invaluable service by providing excellent, extremely rich transcriptions of Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts that, at the moment of this writing, can be accessed online at no cost. The XML files created by the WAB include all the information which the originals themselves contain—including emphases, strikeouts, alternatives, sidenotes, page breaks, and more—and allow the user to dynamically select which information set should be displayed. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of this resource, and the generosity behind the decision—by Trinity and the WAB—to make it available on the internet for free should be duly stressed. The effort that went into making and proofreading the transcriptions should also be recognised. The question arises whether and to what extent this effort cannot count as a creative one. | ||
What was said above remains valid for the WAB transcriptions: insofar as creating a digital edition of a handwritten or typewritten text consists of a 1-to-1 substitution of some visual feature with the corresponding character or XML tag, the output is to be considered a faithtul reproduction of the original material and cannot, in and of itself, be copyrighted. However, two points must be stressed that were not relevant in the case we discussed previously, the example of the French translation of the ''Tractatus'', but are important here. | What was said above remains valid for the WAB transcriptions: insofar as creating a digital edition of a handwritten or typewritten text consists of a 1-to-1 substitution of some visual feature with the corresponding character or XML tag, the output is to be considered a faithtul reproduction of the original material and cannot, in and of itself, be copyrighted. However, two points must be stressed that were not relevant in the case we discussed previously, the example of the French translation of the ''Tractatus'', but are important here. | ||
The first point is that, even though the WAB’s transcriptions are produced in accordance with strict rules based on the {{plainlink|[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Text_Encoding_Initiative TEI Guidelines]}}, in many cases the transcriber is forced to propose what we may call an interpretation. This is, in turn, not only because Wittgenstein’s handwritten texts, unlike printed texts, may be difficult to decipher on the grounds of the quality of the author’s penmanship; but also and perhaps most importantly because the transcriber must systematically decide whether or not to include some visual items in the transcription based on whether or not they are semantically relevant, and to how to encode them based on what their semantical value | The first point is that, even though the WAB’s transcriptions are produced in accordance with strict rules based on the {{plainlink|[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Text_Encoding_Initiative TEI Guidelines]}}, in many cases the transcriber is forced to propose what we may call an interpretation. This is, in turn, not only because Wittgenstein’s handwritten texts, unlike printed texts, may be difficult to decipher on the grounds of the quality of the author’s penmanship; but also and perhaps most importantly because the transcriber must systematically decide whether or not to include some visual items in the transcription based on whether or not they are semantically relevant, and to how to encode them based on what their semantical value is—which is not always trivial. In other words, very often, more than one way of encoding the text is consistent with the rules.<ref>In A. Pichler, “{{plainlink|[http://wab.uib.no/alois/pichler-kirchb95a.pdf Transcriptions, Texts and Interpretation]}}”, in Kjell S. Johannessen and Tore Nordenstam (eds.), ''Culture and Value. Beiträge des 18. Internationalen Wittgenstein Symposiums. 13.-20. August 1995 Kirchberg am Wechsel'', ALWG, 1995, p. 695, retrieved 20 November 2022 ({{plainlink|[https://web.archive.org/web/2/http://wab.uib.no/alois/pichler-kirchb95a.pdf archived URL]}}), Alois Pichler argues that “transcription work is essentially selective and interpretational in nature”. While this wording may be too bold, in the same paper (pp. 693–694) Pichler lists several good reasons why the WAB’s transcription cannot count as literatim transcriptions.</ref> Where there is room for this kind of uncertainty and an interpretation is needed to make up for the uncertainty, there is room for originality too. | ||
The second point is that the WAB’s transcriptions also make Wittgenstein’s implicit references to people and books explicit:<ref>See A. Pichler, ''Transcriptions, Texts and Interpretation'', p. 695.</ref> embedded in the XML files are also the full names of people Wittgenstein only mentions by surname or talks about without naming them at all; information about the books Wittgenstein discusses or quotes from without citing the full title; etc.; here, again, the transcriber can then be said to be responsible for an interpretation, and, again, where there is a margin for interpretation (when the multiplicity of the text is not exactly the multiplicity that is needed for the transcription to be unequivocal), there is room for originality too. | The second point is that the WAB’s transcriptions also make Wittgenstein’s implicit references to people and books explicit:<ref>See A. Pichler, ''Transcriptions, Texts and Interpretation'', p. 695.</ref> embedded in the XML files are also the full names of people Wittgenstein only mentions by surname or talks about without naming them at all; information about the books Wittgenstein discusses or quotes from without citing the full title; etc.; here, again, the transcriber can then be said to be responsible for an interpretation, and, again, where there is a margin for interpretation (when the multiplicity of the text is not exactly the multiplicity that is needed for the transcription to be unequivocal), there is room for originality too. | ||
When talking about the transcription of the French print edition of the ''Tractatus'', it was said that because the procedure was tantamount to copying, it did not generate a new copyright layer; when talking about the WAB transcriptions, it should be said that if or when the procedure was tantamount to copying, it did not generate a new copyright layer, but if or when it was not, it did. It could also be agreed to express this | When talking about the transcription of the French print edition of the ''Tractatus'', it was said that because the procedure was tantamount to copying, it did not generate a new copyright layer; when talking about the WAB transcriptions, it should be said that if or when the procedure was tantamount to copying, it did not generate a new copyright layer, but if or when it was not, it did. It could also be agreed to express this conclusion—which, incidentally, is an open conclusion, that does not claim to settle the question of the copyright status of the WAB’s XML files once and for all—by saying that, unlinke the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project’s digital edition of the Granger translation of the ''Tractatus'', the WAB’s XML files, or at least some of them, are more than just transcriptions.<ref>This claim is made explicitly by Pichler in A. Pichler, ''Transcriptions, Texts and Interpretation'', p. 690.</ref> | ||
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=== The authorship issue === | === The authorship issue === | ||
It should be added that, from the point of view of Wittgenstein scholarship, the issue of copyright layers is particularly thorny when it comes to assessing the impact of the editors’ work on the very authorship of a published book. This issue is related to but different from the main issue of this | It should be added that, from the point of view of Wittgenstein scholarship, the issue of copyright layers is particularly thorny when it comes to assessing the impact of the editors’ work on the very authorship of a published book. This issue is related to but different from the main issue of this paper and will only be briefly touched upon here. | ||
Except for the ''Tractatus'', all of Wittgenstein’s philosophy ''books'' were published posthumously. In some cases, for example that of the ''Philosophical Investigations'', Wittgenstein himself came very close to having the book ready for the printing press; in some others, for example that of ''On Certainty'', he marked a few sections of his notebooks in such a way as to make it clear that they belonged together, which, in turn, was taken by the literary executors to be a strong indication that it would make sense to publish them as a standalone work. In such instances, very little room was left for the editors to be original or creative, and it would be difficult to argue that what they did with Wittgenstein’s own writings in order to turn them into books generated a new layer of copyright. | Except for the ''Tractatus'', all of Wittgenstein’s philosophy ''books'' were published posthumously. In some cases, for example that of the ''Philosophical Investigations'', Wittgenstein himself came very close to having the book ready for the printing press; in some others, for example that of ''On Certainty'', he marked a few sections of his notebooks in such a way as to make it clear that they belonged together, which, in turn, was taken by the literary executors to be a strong indication that it would make sense to publish them as a standalone work. In such instances, very little room was left for the editors to be original or creative, and it would be difficult to argue that what they did with Wittgenstein’s own writings in order to turn them into books generated a new layer of copyright. | ||
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In yet other cases, however, the editors’ intervention was very significant in selecting and sorting Wittgenstein’s remarks while preparing them for publication, so that originality or creativity may be said to have been involved. The best example of this is probably G.H. von Wright’s editing of ''Culture and Value''. In such instances, the editors may have to be considered co-authors, thereby extending the copyright term on a work beyond the 70-year period after Wittgenstein’s death. | In yet other cases, however, the editors’ intervention was very significant in selecting and sorting Wittgenstein’s remarks while preparing them for publication, so that originality or creativity may be said to have been involved. The best example of this is probably G.H. von Wright’s editing of ''Culture and Value''. In such instances, the editors may have to be considered co-authors, thereby extending the copyright term on a work beyond the 70-year period after Wittgenstein’s death. | ||
Given the uncertainty of this matter, the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project opted for a cautious approach, which is presented in [[Project:Why are some of Wittgenstein’s texts missing from this website?|a separate essay]]. Further discussing the problem or the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project’s solution to it would lead us away from the main issue of this | Given the uncertainty of this matter, the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project opted for a cautious approach, which is presented in [[Project:Why are some of Wittgenstein’s texts missing from this website?|a separate essay]]. Further discussing the problem or the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project’s solution to it would lead us away from the main issue of this paper, because there is the question of the copyright status of works that have Wittgenstein as their author—and this is the main issue of this paper—and then there is the question of the authorship of works that may not have Wittgenstein as their sole author: neither is trivial, but the latter does not affect the former. | ||
== Contracts, constraints unrelated to intellectual property, and politeness == | == Contracts, constraints unrelated to intellectual property, and politeness == | ||
When a person is the holder of the copyright on a given work (because they are the author or because they are the author’s heir), they have the right to sign contracts that give others permission to use the work in specific ways under specific conditions. Typically, an author will sign an agreement with a publisher in order for the latter to print, distribute and sell the book and for the former to receive a sum of money in | When a person is the holder of the copyright on a given work (because they are the author or because they are the author’s heir), they have the right to sign contracts that give others permission to use the work in specific ways under specific conditions. Typically, an author will sign an agreement with a publisher in order for the latter to print, distribute and sell the book and for the former to receive a sum of money in exchange—often a royalty, i.e., a percentage of the cover price of the copies sold. | ||
Regardless of the agreements that copyright holders and publishers may have, however, the expiry of the copyright term is always a sufficient condition for the work to be in the public domain. No contract has the power to extend copyright protection beyond the term defined by the local legislation. | Regardless of the agreements that copyright holders and publishers may have, however, the expiry of the copyright term is always a sufficient condition for the work to be in the public domain. No contract has the power to extend copyright protection beyond the term defined by the local legislation. | ||
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One such restriction is what we call “moral rights”. Moral rights have to do with the author’s dignity as such and with their unique relationship to their work. In some countries, they do not expire. The definition of moral rights also varies across jurisdictions, but most often they include the right of attribution and the prohibition that works be remixed in a way that negatively affects the author, their image, or their reputation. This wording may seem to forbid adding a moustache to a reproduction of ''Mona Lisa'' or creating a horror version of ''Winnie-the-Pooh'', but in practice such things are widely accepted, as long as it is clear that the parody or distortion is attributable to the remixer, and not to the author. Moral rights have limited import as far as copyright and the public domain are concerned: insofar as they entail the obligation to attribute authors, for example, they do restrict the scope of what cen be done with public domain works, since by the definition of public domain alone attributing authors whose copyright expired would not be compulsory;<ref>The author of this essay would like to thank Dr Nicolas Bell of Trinity College for providing a comment thanks to which the early, incorrect wording of this sentence was corrected.</ref> however, they entirely lack the characteristic feature of copyright laws that has to do with establishing someone’s monopoly on a set of works. Moral rights have no financial import whatsoever. | One such restriction is what we call “moral rights”. Moral rights have to do with the author’s dignity as such and with their unique relationship to their work. In some countries, they do not expire. The definition of moral rights also varies across jurisdictions, but most often they include the right of attribution and the prohibition that works be remixed in a way that negatively affects the author, their image, or their reputation. This wording may seem to forbid adding a moustache to a reproduction of ''Mona Lisa'' or creating a horror version of ''Winnie-the-Pooh'', but in practice such things are widely accepted, as long as it is clear that the parody or distortion is attributable to the remixer, and not to the author. Moral rights have limited import as far as copyright and the public domain are concerned: insofar as they entail the obligation to attribute authors, for example, they do restrict the scope of what cen be done with public domain works, since by the definition of public domain alone attributing authors whose copyright expired would not be compulsory;<ref>The author of this essay would like to thank Dr Nicolas Bell of Trinity College for providing a comment thanks to which the early, incorrect wording of this sentence was corrected.</ref> however, they entirely lack the characteristic feature of copyright laws that has to do with establishing someone’s monopoly on a set of works. Moral rights have no financial import whatsoever. | ||
Another set of restrictions may arise from the fact that, even after copyright expires, ownership of the original specimen remains. Thus, for example, the Louvre may well forbid visitors to take photos of its | Another set of restrictions may arise from the fact that, even after copyright expires, ownership of the original specimen remains. Thus, for example, the Louvre may well forbid visitors to take photos of its paintings—even though most of the works in the museum are out of copyright—simply because they have the authority to dictate the house rules; on the other hand, they have no authority to forbid us to freely share, modify and even sell the faithful reproductions of public-domain two-dimensional works that can be found on their very website. In the case of Wittgenstein, his originals have several different owners—the Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge; the Austrian National Library, Vienna; the Bodleian Library, Oxford; the Noord Hollands Archief, Haarlem; the Bertrand Russell Archives, McMaster University Library, Hamilton<ref>''{{plainlink|[https://wittgenstein-initiative.com/unesco-certificate-and-nomination-form/ UNESCO Certificate and Nomination Form]}}'', Wittgenstein Initiative, 25 January 2018, retrieved 16 July 2022 ({{plainlink|[https://web.archive.org/web/20220716093211/https://wittgenstein-initiative.com/unesco-certificate-and-nomination-form/ archived URL]}}).</ref>—but this also has no import as far as copyright and the public domain are concerned. | ||
Finally, even in the arid landscape of copyright law and the harsh arena of the publishing business, politeness and ''bona fides'' are not without importance. It remains a good practice to inform the former copyright holders or the owners of the originals when a new edition or translation of a public-domain text is planned; and it is crucial that projects which share the same goal of improving the availability of a given cultural asset to the public are well coordinated, do not uselessly compete with each other, and on the contrary work together in a spirit of cooperation or, at least, complementarity. This is as good a place as any to say that if the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project were to fail to comply with these basic rules of manners it would not be because of a slapdash attitude, but because of a failure to identify some of the many stakeholders. | Finally, even in the arid landscape of copyright law and the harsh arena of the publishing business, politeness and ''bona fides'' are not without importance. It remains a good practice to inform the former copyright holders or the owners of the originals when a new edition or translation of a public-domain text is planned; and it is crucial that projects which share the same goal of improving the availability of a given cultural asset to the public are well coordinated, do not uselessly compete with each other, and on the contrary work together in a spirit of cooperation or, at least, complementarity. This is as good a place as any to say that if the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project were to fail to comply with these basic rules of manners it would not be because of a slapdash attitude, but because of a failure to identify some of the many stakeholders. | ||
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Copyright law has changed remarkably little to meet the challenges of the digital age. The most significant innovation in the landscape of copyright law since the beginning of the 21st century has been the codification and the spread of the Creative Commons licences, which will be briefly discussed below, in [[#The Creative Commons licences|§ The Creative Commons licences]]. Other than that, the world’s copyright system is not designed for the digital age, and often seems to be altogether unfit for it. | Copyright law has changed remarkably little to meet the challenges of the digital age. The most significant innovation in the landscape of copyright law since the beginning of the 21st century has been the codification and the spread of the Creative Commons licences, which will be briefly discussed below, in [[#The Creative Commons licences|§ The Creative Commons licences]]. Other than that, the world’s copyright system is not designed for the digital age, and often seems to be altogether unfit for it. | ||
One of the challenges for those who are looking to lawfully share out-of-copyright content in a digital format is the fact that the web is an intrinsically international | One of the challenges for those who are looking to lawfully share out-of-copyright content in a digital format is the fact that the web is an intrinsically international space—it is, after all, the worldwide web—and within it national borders are almost non-existent. | ||
As far as copyright is concerned, international relations are still largely regulated by the Berne Convention,<ref>More information on the Berne Convention, as well as the full text of the document, can be found on the website of the WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization): {{plainlink|[https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/index.html Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works]}}.</ref> adopted in 1886 and last amended in 1979. This document establishes that signatory countries must grant copyright protection to all works that have another signatory country as their country of origin. | As far as copyright is concerned, international relations are still largely regulated by the Berne Convention,<ref>More information on the Berne Convention, as well as the full text of the document, can be found on the website of the WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization): {{plainlink|[https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/index.html Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works]}}.</ref> adopted in 1886 and last amended in 1979. This document establishes that signatory countries must grant copyright protection to all works that have another signatory country as their country of origin. | ||
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* Creative Commons Attribution – ShareAlike (CC BY-SA): the work can be used for all purposes, but the author must be credited and derivative works, if any, must also be licenced under CC BY-SA; | * Creative Commons Attribution – ShareAlike (CC BY-SA): the work can be used for all purposes, but the author must be credited and derivative works, if any, must also be licenced under CC BY-SA; | ||
* Creative Commons Attribution – NonCommercial (CC BY-NC): the work can be used for non-commercial purposes only; the author must be credited; | * Creative Commons Attribution – NonCommercial (CC BY-NC): the work can be used for non-commercial purposes only; the author must be credited; | ||
* Attribution – NonCommercial – ShareAlike (CC BY-NC-SA): the work can be used for non-commercial purposes only; the author must be credited and derivative works, if any, must also be licenced under CC BY-NC-SA. | * Creative Commons Attribution – NonCommercial – ShareAlike (CC BY-NC-SA): the work can be used for non-commercial purposes only; the author must be credited and derivative works, if any, must also be licenced under CC BY-NC-SA. | ||
* Attribution – NoDerivatives (CC BY-ND): the work can be used for all purposes, but it cannot be remixed; the author must be credited; | * Creative Commons Attribution – NoDerivatives (CC BY-ND): the work can be used for all purposes, but it cannot be remixed; the author must be credited; | ||
* Attribution – NonCommercial – NoDerivatives (CC BY-NC-ND): the work can be used for non-commercial purposes only, and it cannot be remixed; the author must be credited. | * Creative Commons Attribution – NonCommercial – NoDerivatives (CC BY-NC-ND): the work can be used for non-commercial purposes only, and it cannot be remixed; the author must be credited. | ||
Creative Commons Attribution and Attribution – ShareAlike are considered “free” licences because they allow reusing the work for any purpose, including commercially, and remixing it; in this sense, the other licences are “non-free”, even though they still allow reusing the work and, in some cases, remixing it under stricter conditions. | Creative Commons Attribution and Attribution – ShareAlike are considered “free” licences because they allow reusing the work for any purpose, including commercially, and remixing it; in this sense, the other licences are “non-free”, even though they still allow reusing the work and, in some cases, remixing it under stricter conditions. | ||
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In this section, we will apply the concepts described above in order to clarify the copyright status of Wittgenstein’s works.<ref>Information about first editions was taken from Alois Pichler, Michael A. R. Biggs, Sarah Anna Szeltner, “{{plainlink|[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305935004_Bibliographie_der_deutsch-_und_englischsprachigen_Wittgenstein-Ausgaben Bibliographie Der Deutsch- Und Englischsprachigen Wittgenstein-Ausgaben]}}”, in ''Wittgenstein-Studien'', 2011 (updated 2019) ({{plainlink|[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305935004_Bibliographie_der_deutsch-_und_englischsprachigen_Wittgenstein-Ausgaben archived URL]}}).</ref> We will limit ourselves to those that have been published on the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project’s website<!-- or might be in the short-to-medium term-->, thereby excluding those texts where the editors may have to be counted as co-authors. | In this section, we will apply the concepts described above in order to clarify the copyright status of Wittgenstein’s works.<ref>Information about first editions was taken from Alois Pichler, Michael A. R. Biggs, Sarah Anna Szeltner, “{{plainlink|[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305935004_Bibliographie_der_deutsch-_und_englischsprachigen_Wittgenstein-Ausgaben Bibliographie Der Deutsch- Und Englischsprachigen Wittgenstein-Ausgaben]}}”, in ''Wittgenstein-Studien'', 2011 (updated 2019) ({{plainlink|[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305935004_Bibliographie_der_deutsch-_und_englischsprachigen_Wittgenstein-Ausgaben archived URL]}}).</ref> We will limit ourselves to those that have been published on the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project’s website<!-- or might be in the short-to-medium term-->, thereby excluding those texts where the editors may have to be counted as co-authors. | ||
For each work, the copyright status in the country of origin and in Italy will be described and explained.<ref>In the paragraphs below, when a country’s copyright term is mentioned for the first time, the relevant intellectual property law is | For each work, the copyright status in the country of origin and in Italy will be described and explained.<ref>In the paragraphs below, when a country’s copyright term is mentioned for the first time, the relevant intellectual property law is cited—except in the case of the US, where the reference is to a secondary source. Each of the cited laws is listed by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) as the main IP law enacted by the relevant legislature.</ref> What is written about Italy can be considered to be valid, to some extent, for all countries where, as a general rule, copyright expires 70 years or fewer P.M.A.; however, since local exceptions may exist, generalisations should be made, so to speak, at one’s own risk. Occasionally, the copyright status in the United States will be discussed, as the US, despite not playing any special role from the point of view of the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project, are certainly, to this day, the centre of gravity of the web. | ||
The information is valid and up to date as of July 2022. Copyrights that are still standing will gradually expire in the coming years and decades. | The information is valid and up to date as of July 2022. Copyrights that are still standing will gradually expire in the coming years and decades. | ||
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Their country of origin is the US.<ref name="simultaneous">According to the Berne Convention, “The country of origin shall be considered to be: (a) in the case of works first published in a country of the Union, that country; in the case of works published simultaneously in several countries of the Union which grant different terms of protection, the country whose legislation grants the shortest term of protection [...]” (art. 5, par. 4). The definition of “simultaneous publication” is publication in multiple countries within 30 days (see art. 3, par. 4). We haven’t been able to prove that in the 1950s the ''Journal of Philosophy'' consistently reached its Canadian or European subscribers within 30 days of the publication in the US, but we haven’t been able to conclusively rule it out either. If it were possible to prove that this was the case in at least one country with a 50 or 70 years P.M.A. copyright term, then the ''Notes on Logic'' would count as simultaneously published in the US and in that country; therefore, per the Berne Convention, they would have that country as their country of origin; therefore, per the copyright laws of that country, they would now be in the public domain in their country of origin.</ref> In order to determine the copyright status of a work which has the US as its country of origin, knowledge of the date of the author’s death is not sufficient. Per the {{Plainlink|[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Hirtle_chart Hirtle chart]}},<ref name="hirtle-chart"/> the current copyright status of a work first published in the US between 1927 and 1964 depends on whether or not it was published with a copyright notice (which we should assume was the case) and, if it was, on whether or not copyright was renewed before its expiry, the term of which was then 28 years: if copyright was renewed, the text is still copyrighted in the US; if it wasn’t, the text is now in the public domain in the US. Lacking further information, it should be assumed that the copyright on this text was renewed. Assuming that it was indeed renewed, then the duration of its copyright term is 95 years from the publication date, meaning that it will enter the public domain the US on 1 January 2053.<ref name="hirtle-chart" /> | Their country of origin is the US.<ref name="simultaneous">According to the Berne Convention, “The country of origin shall be considered to be: (a) in the case of works first published in a country of the Union, that country; in the case of works published simultaneously in several countries of the Union which grant different terms of protection, the country whose legislation grants the shortest term of protection [...]” (art. 5, par. 4). The definition of “simultaneous publication” is publication in multiple countries within 30 days (see art. 3, par. 4). We haven’t been able to prove that in the 1950s the ''Journal of Philosophy'' consistently reached its Canadian or European subscribers within 30 days of the publication in the US, but we haven’t been able to conclusively rule it out either. If it were possible to prove that this was the case in at least one country with a 50 or 70 years P.M.A. copyright term, then the ''Notes on Logic'' would count as simultaneously published in the US and in that country; therefore, per the Berne Convention, they would have that country as their country of origin; therefore, per the copyright laws of that country, they would now be in the public domain in their country of origin.</ref> In order to determine the copyright status of a work which has the US as its country of origin, knowledge of the date of the author’s death is not sufficient. Per the {{Plainlink|[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Hirtle_chart Hirtle chart]}},<ref name="hirtle-chart"/> the current copyright status of a work first published in the US between 1927 and 1964 depends on whether or not it was published with a copyright notice (which we should assume was the case) and, if it was, on whether or not copyright was renewed before its expiry, the term of which was then 28 years: if copyright was renewed, the text is still copyrighted in the US; if it wasn’t, the text is now in the public domain in the US. Lacking further information, it should be assumed that the copyright on this text was renewed. Assuming that it was indeed renewed, then the duration of its copyright term is 95 years from the publication date, meaning that it will enter the public domain the US on 1 January 2053.<ref name="hirtle-chart" /> | ||
However, in February 2017 Wittgenstein’s Ts-201a1 and Ts-201a2, containing the text of the ''Notes on Logic'', were released by the copyright | However, in February 2017 Wittgenstein’s Ts-201a1 and Ts-201a2, containing the text of the ''Notes on Logic'', were released by the copyright holders—The Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge; Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University Library, Hamilton, Ontario; University of Bergen, Bergen—under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution – NonCommercial 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC). Therefore, the text should be regarded as being in the public domain in countries where the copyright term is 70 years P.M.A. and licenced under CC BY-NC 4.0 International in the US. As was discussed above in this essay (see [[#Copyright in the age of the internet|§ Copyright in the age of the internet]]), a work being in the public domain in its country of origin is not a requirement for it to be freely reusable, remixable, etc. elsewhere, but rather a generally accepted good practice when the work is to be published on the internet; because of the internet’s lack of national boundaries, in other words, we consider it a good compromise to always make sure that we abide by the rules both of a work’s country of origin and of the country where the work is used, remixed, etc. The situation is similar when a work is not in the public domain in its country of origin but rather is licenced under the terms of a Creative Commons licence: we always want to abide by the rules both of a work’s country of origin and of the country where the work is used, remixed, etc. In this case, this means treating the work (Wittgenstein’s original text) as though it was also licenced under CC BY-NC in Italy, where the work is in the public domain because the copyright term for literary works is 70 years P.M.A.<ref>Italian copyright law only has a specific provision for posthumously published works if the posthumous work is first published after the expiry of copyright. In Wittgenstein’s case, this would only be relevant to writings unpublished as of 1 January 2022. See ''Legge 633/1941,'' article 31 and 85(3).</ref> Now, CC BY-NC does not prohibit derivative works (for it does not include the “ND”, “NoDerivatives” clause), nor does it require derivative works to be licenced under the same terms (for it does not include the “SA”, “ShareAlike” clause). Therefore, the Ludwig Wittgenstein Project’s Italian translation of this text was published under CC BY-SA. | ||
=== Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway === | === Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway === | ||
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Additionally, it is in the public domain in the United States because it was published in 1926 and everything that was published before 1 January 1927 is now in the public domain in the US. | Additionally, it is in the public domain in the United States because it was published in 1926 and everything that was published before 1 January 1927 is now in the public domain in the US. | ||
The preface (''Geleitwort zum Wörterbuch für Volksschulen'') was first published in ''Wörterbuch für Volksschulen'', edited by A. Hübner, E. Leinfellner and W. Leinfellner, Schriften der Österreichischen Wittgensteingesellschaft, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna 1977, pp. {{Small caps|xxv}}–{{Small caps|xxxv}}. Its country of origin is Austria. This work is in the public domain there, as well as in Italy, because the copyright term for literary works in both countries is 70 years P.M.A.<ref>''Bundesgesetz über das Urheberrecht an Werken der Literatur und der Kunst und über verwandte Schutzrechte (Urheberrechtsgesetz)'', BGBl. Nr. 111/1936 – | The preface (''Geleitwort zum Wörterbuch für Volksschulen'') was first published in ''Wörterbuch für Volksschulen'', edited by A. Hübner, E. Leinfellner and W. Leinfellner, Schriften der Österreichischen Wittgensteingesellschaft, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna 1977, pp. {{Small caps|xxv}}–{{Small caps|xxxv}}. Its country of origin is Austria. This work is in the public domain there, as well as in Italy, because the copyright term for literary works in both countries is 70 years P.M.A.<ref>''Bundesgesetz über das Urheberrecht an Werken der Literatur und der Kunst und über verwandte Schutzrechte (Urheberrechtsgesetz)'', BGBl. Nr. 111/1936 – BGBl. I Nr. 63/2018, article 60. Austrian copyright law does not have specific provisions for posthumously published works.</ref> and the author died before 1952. | ||
=== Some Remarks on Logical Form === | === Some Remarks on Logical Form === | ||
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Its country of origin is the US.<ref name="simultaneous"/> | Its country of origin is the US.<ref name="simultaneous"/> | ||
However, in February 2017 the text of Wittgenstein’s Ts-207 was released by the copyright | However, in February 2017 the text of Wittgenstein’s Ts-207 was released by the copyright holders—The Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge and the University of Bergen, Bergen—under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution – NonCommercial 4.0 International licence. The text of the ''Lecture on Ethics'' that was published in the ''Philosophical Review'' in 1965 only differs from the text of Ts-207 for very few spelling variants and punctuation marks; the two must thus be considered to be the same text and to share the same copyright status. Therefore, the text should be regarded as being in the public domain in countries where the copyright term is 70 years PMA and licenced under CC BY-NC 4.0 International in the US. See above, [[#Notes on Logic|§ ''Notes on Logic'']], for more details. | ||
=== Bemerkungen über Frazers “The Golden Bough” === | === Bemerkungen über Frazers “The Golden Bough” === | ||