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Another expression akin to those we have just considered {{Brown Book Ts reference|Ts-310,132}} is this: “Here it is; take it or leave it!” And this again is akin to a kind of introductory statement which we sometimes make before remarking on certain alternatives, as when we say: “It either rains or it doesn't rain; if it rains we'll stay in my room, if it doesn't … ” The first part of this sentence is no piece of information (just as “Take it or leave it” is no order). Instead of, “It either rains or it doesn't rain” we could have said, “Consider the two cases … ” Our expression underlines these cases, presents them to your attention. | Another expression akin to those we have just considered {{Brown Book Ts reference|Ts-310,132}} is this: “Here it is; take it or leave it!” And this again is akin to a kind of introductory statement which we sometimes make before remarking on certain alternatives, as when we say: “It either rains or it doesn't rain; if it rains we'll stay in my room, if it doesn't … ” The first part of this sentence is no piece of information (just as “Take it or leave it” is no order). Instead of, “It either rains or it doesn't rain” we could have said, “Consider the two cases … ” Our expression underlines these cases, presents them to your attention. | ||
It is closely connected with this that in describing a case like 30) || 30) or 31 | It is closely connected with this that in describing a case like 30) || 30) or 31) we are tempted to use the phrase, “There is, ''of course'', a number beyond which no one of the tribe has ever counted; let this number be … ” Straightened out this reads: “Let the number beyond which no one of the tribe has ever counted be … ” Why we tend to prefer the first expression to the one straightened out is that it more strongly directs our attention to the upper end of the range of numerals used by our tribe in their actual practice. | ||
Let us now consider a very instructive case of that use of the word “particular” in which it does not point to a comparison || in which it doesn't indicate that I'm making a comparison, and yet seems most strongly to do so, – the case when we contemplate the expression of a face primitively drawn in this way: [[File:Brown Book 2-Ts310,132.png|40px|link=]]. Let this face produce an impression on you. You may then feel inclined to say: “Surely I don't see mere strokes. || dashes. I see a face with a ''particular'' expression.” But you don't mean that it has an outstanding expression nor is it said as an introduction to a description of the expression, though we {{Brown Book Ts reference|Ts-310,133}} might give such a description and say, e.g., “It looks like a complacent business man, stupidly supercilious, who though fat, imagines he's a lady killer.” But this would only be meant as an approximate description of the expression. “Words can't exactly describe it”, one sometimes says. And yet one feels that what one calls the expression of the face is something that can be detached from the drawing of the face. It is as though we could say: “This face has a particular expression: namely this” (pointing to something). But if I had to point to anything in this place it would have to be the face || drawing I am looking at. (We are, as it were, under an optic delusion which by some sort of reflection makes us think that there are two objects where there is only one.) The delusion is assisted by our using the verb “to have”, saying “The face ''has'' a particular expression.” Things look different when, instead of this, we say: “This ''is'' a peculiar face.” (What a thing ''is'', we mean, is bound up with it; what it has can be separated from it.) | Let us now consider a very instructive case of that use of the word “particular” in which it does not point to a comparison || in which it doesn't indicate that I'm making a comparison, and yet seems most strongly to do so, – the case when we contemplate the expression of a face primitively drawn in this way: [[File:Brown Book 2-Ts310,132.png|40px|link=]]. Let this face produce an impression on you. You may then feel inclined to say: “Surely I don't see mere strokes. || dashes. I see a face with a ''particular'' expression.” But you don't mean that it has an outstanding expression nor is it said as an introduction to a description of the expression, though we {{Brown Book Ts reference|Ts-310,133}} might give such a description and say, e.g., “It looks like a complacent business man, stupidly supercilious, who though fat, imagines he's a lady killer.” But this would only be meant as an approximate description of the expression. “Words can't exactly describe it”, one sometimes says. And yet one feels that what one calls the expression of the face is something that can be detached from the drawing of the face. It is as though we could say: “This face has a particular expression: namely this” (pointing to something). But if I had to point to anything in this place it would have to be the face || drawing I am looking at. (We are, as it were, under an optic delusion which by some sort of reflection makes us think that there are two objects where there is only one.) The delusion is assisted by our using the verb “to have”, saying “The face ''has'' a particular expression.” Things look different when, instead of this, we say: “This ''is'' a peculiar face.” (What a thing ''is'', we mean, is bound up with it; what it has can be separated from it.) | ||