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== Introduction. The purpose of copyright and the public domain ==
== Introduction. The purpose of copyright and the public domain ==
Before starting to talk about Wittgenstein and his writings, it is important to briefly discuss the purpose of copyright and the general logic of it. This will help us gain a better understanding of the ethics behind the laws and make sense of what copyright is and is not.
Before starting to talk about Wittgenstein and his writings, it is important to briefly discuss the purpose of copyright and its general logic. This will help us gain a better understanding of the ethics behind the laws and make sense of what copyright is and what is not.


Copyright aims to ensure that anyone who performs a creative effort and gives birth to a creative work controls the reproduction and dissemination of such work. Others do not, by default, have the right to copy it – hence the term – without the author’s permission, which is usually granted for a fee. This, in turn, ensures that artists and intellectuals have at least a chance at making a living out of their creative labour.
Copyright aims to ensure that anyone who performs a creative effort and gives birth to a creative work controls the reproduction and dissemination of such work. Others do not, by default, have the right to copy it – hence the term – without the author’s permission, which is usually granted for a fee. This, in turn, ensures that artists and intellectuals have at least a chance at making a living out of their creative labour.


The concept of “copyright” relies on the obvious understanding that intellectual property is unlike other forms of property in that breaching it – “stealing” – does not mean that the original owner ceases to be in possession of their work. Copies can be made of books, pictures, recordings, etc. that leave the originals intact, whereas stealing gold or cattle means taking it away from someone. “Owning” a book as its author does, for example, as opposed to owning an individual specimen as a reader may, means having legal control over what can and cannot be done with it; “stealing” a book means doing things with it that the author has not agreed to, and this goes way beyond shoplifting an individual specimen.
The concept of “copyright” relies on the understanding that intellectual property is unlike other forms of property in that breaching it – “stealing” – does not mean that the original owner ceases to be in possession of their work. Copies can be made of books, pictures, recordings, etc. that leave the originals intact, whereas stealing gold or cattle means taking it away from someone. “Owning” a book as its author does, for example, as opposed to owning an individual specimen as a reader may, means having legal control over what can and cannot be done with it; “stealing” a book means doing things with it that the author has not agreed to, and this goes way beyond shoplifting an individual specimen.


Thus, the aim of copyright is, among other things, to make creativity viable on the market by giving authors monopoly over the distribution of the copies of their works. By being the only authorised sellers of those works, albeit often with the intermediation of a publisher, or a label, etc., authors may be able to secure an income.
Thus, the aim of copyright is, among other things, to make creativity viable on the market by giving authors monopoly over the distribution of the copies of their works. By being the only authorised sellers of those works, albeit often with the intermediation of a publisher, or a label, etc., authors may be able to secure an income.


The difference between intellectual property and the property of material goods, however, has implications that reach beyond the relative ease of breaching the former compared to breaching the latter. The very power of culture consists, in fact, in the possibility for words, pictures, music, etc. to be reproduced with relatively little effort and, most importantly, ''without thereby consuming, diminishing, or getting any closer to the depletion of the “source”''. As the saying – often misattributed to George Bernard Shaw – goes: “If you have an apple and I have an apple and we exchange apples then you and I will still each have one apple. But if you have an idea and I have an idea and we exchange these ideas, then each of us will have two ideas”. The benefit that society as a whole gains from the exchange and the transmission of ideas has long been clear. Therefore, a limitation always accompanies the affirmation of the author’s rights over their works: eventually, copyright expires, and the works become public property. Unlike the property a house, then, which can be handed over from parents to children by way of inheritance for, in principle, endless generations, the intellectual property of a creative work expires two to three generations after the author’s death, depending on the country or territory.
The difference between intellectual property and the property of material goods, however, has implications that reach beyond the relative ease of breaching the former compared to breaching the latter. The very power of culture consists in the possibility for words, pictures, music, etc. to be reproduced with relatively little effort and, most importantly, ''without thereby consuming, diminishing, or getting any closer to the depletion of the “source”''. As the saying – often misattributed to George Bernard Shaw – goes: “If you have an apple and I have an apple and we exchange apples then you and I will still each have one apple. But if you have an idea and I have an idea and we exchange these ideas, then each of us will have two ideas”. The benefit that society as a whole gains from the exchange and the transmission of ideas has long been clear. Therefore, a limitation always accompanies the affirmation of the author’s rights over their works: eventually, copyright expires, and the works become public property. Unlike the property a house, then, which can be handed over from parents to children by way of inheritance for, in principle, endless generations, the intellectual property of a creative work expires two to three generations after the author’s death, depending on the country or territory.


The rationale for the finite duration of the copyright term is related precisely to the concept, firstly, that the circulation of ideas through the replication of works of art (and fiction, and nonfiction…) is in the interest of the human community, and not only in the interest of the author and their heirs; and, secondly, that if such circulation is free not only in the sense of freedom, but also in that of gratuity, the interest of the human spirit will be much better served.
The rationale for the finite duration of the copyright term lies, firstly, in the concept that the circulation of ideas through the replication of works of art (and fiction, and nonfiction) is in the interest of the human community, and not only in the interest of the author and their heirs; and, secondly, in the concept that if such circulation is free not only in the sense of freedom, but also in the sense of gratuity, the interest of the human spirit will be much better served.


[[File:Wittgenstein's testament.jpg|thumb|right|Wittgenstein's testament. “I give to Mr. R. Rhees Miss G.E.M. Anscombe and Professor G.H. von Wright of Trinity College Cambridge All the copyright in all my unpublished writings and also the manuscripts and typescripts thereof to dispose of as they think best but subject to any claim by anybody else to the custody of the manuscripts and typescripts. I intend and desire that Mr. Rhees Miss Anscombe and Professor von Wright shall publish as many of my unpublished writings as they think fit but I do not wish them to incur expenses in publication which they do not expect to recoup out of royalties or other profits.”]]
[[File:Wittgenstein's testament.jpg|thumb|right|Wittgenstein's testament. “I give to Mr. R. Rhees Miss G.E.M. Anscombe and Professor G.H. von Wright of Trinity College Cambridge All the copyright in all my unpublished writings and also the manuscripts and typescripts thereof to dispose of as they think best but subject to any claim by anybody else to the custody of the manuscripts and typescripts. I intend and desire that Mr. Rhees Miss Anscombe and Professor von Wright shall publish as many of my unpublished writings as they think fit but I do not wish them to incur expenses in publication which they do not expect to recoup out of royalties or other profits.”]]


The logic of copyright and of its term being limited by design, thus, is as follows. Authors should be able to exploit their works financially (in order perhaps, depending on one’s broader moral view, to reward their genius, but also to enable them to keep doing what they do while letting others benefit from their creativity as well). Sooner or later, however, the circulation of such works should stop being subject to the author’s consent or their family’s (in order for the public to fully enjoy the works without limitations of sorts, and especially without having to pay to do so).
The logic of copyright and of its term being limited by design, thus, is as follows. Authors should be able to exploit their works financially (in order perhaps, depending on one’s broader moral view, to reward their genius, but also to enable them to keep doing what they do while letting others benefit from their creativity as well). Sooner or later, however, the circulation of such works should stop being subject to the author’s consent or their family’s (in order for the public to fully enjoy the works without limitations, and especially without having to pay to do so).


In other words, the “spirit” of copyright laws is that:
In other words, the “spirit” of copyright laws is that:
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* then, when the copyright term expires, the work enters the public domain, which means that anyone is legally entitled to copy it, distribute it, sell it, modify it; those who were previously the exclusive holders of the rights are not entitled to any privilege any longer and have, in fact, the same status as all other members of the public; no rights are reserved, except for, in some cases, the few “soft” provisions we call “moral rights” (see below, [[#Contracts, constraints unrelated to intellectual property, and politeness|§ Contracts, constraints unrelated to intellectual property, and politeness]]).
* then, when the copyright term expires, the work enters the public domain, which means that anyone is legally entitled to copy it, distribute it, sell it, modify it; those who were previously the exclusive holders of the rights are not entitled to any privilege any longer and have, in fact, the same status as all other members of the public; no rights are reserved, except for, in some cases, the few “soft” provisions we call “moral rights” (see below, [[#Contracts, constraints unrelated to intellectual property, and politeness|§ Contracts, constraints unrelated to intellectual property, and politeness]]).


The public domain is meant to be a guarantee that culture is not forever subject to the monetary laws of buying and selling. In spite of local differences in copyright legislation, it is remarkable that in every last country on Earth the copyright term is finite, and ''all'' jurisdictions share the moral understanding that it is right for the public to eventually be free to do anything they want with a piece of writing, of music, of visual art, etc.
The public domain is meant to be a guarantee that culture is not forever subject to the monetary laws of buying and selling. In spite of local differences in copyright legislation, it is remarkable that in every last country on Earth the copyright term is finite, and ''all'' jurisdictions share the moral understanding that it is right for the public to eventually be free to do anything they want with a piece of writing, music, visual art, etc.


The public domain is as important a feature of intellectual property laws as copyright. Attempts at restricting the public’s right to access and use works that are in the public domain should be considered as illegal as accessing and using copyrighted material without permission. Of course, it is much more common for publishers to sue for copyright infringement than for individuals or non-for-profits to sue for what we could call “public domain infringement”. This is due to an obvious imbalance in power – that is, financial resources, knowledge, and organisation – but the argument is not any less urgent for this reason.<ref>The very concept of “public domain infringement”, obviously formed in analogy with “copyright infringement”, was coined by the author of this essay. Merely as a proof that the broad moral framework of our culture warrants the analogy, consider articles 27 (“Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”) and 19 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”) of the {{plainlink|[https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Universal_Declaration_of_Human_Rights Universal Declaration of Human Rights]}}.</ref>
The public domain is as important a feature of intellectual property laws as copyright. Attempts at restricting the public’s right to access and use works that are in the public domain should be considered as illegal as accessing and using copyrighted material without permission. Of course, it is much more common for publishers to sue for copyright infringement than for individuals or non-for-profits to sue for what we could call “public domain infringement”. This is due to an obvious imbalance in power – that is, financial resources, knowledge, and organisation – but the argument is not any less urgent for this reason.<ref>The very concept of “public domain infringement”, obviously formed in analogy with “copyright infringement”, was coined by the author of this essay. Merely as a proof that the broad moral framework of our culture warrants the analogy, consider articles 27 (“Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”) and 19 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”) of the {{plainlink|[https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Universal_Declaration_of_Human_Rights Universal Declaration of Human Rights]}}.</ref>


== A very short history of the rights on Wittgenstein’s writings ==
== A very short history of the rights on Wittgenstein’s writings ==
Ludwig Wittgenstein died on 29 April 1951. In his last will and testament, he appointed G.E.M. Anscombe, R. Rhees and G.H. von Wright as his literary heirs. It is them, thus, who became the copyright holders for Wittgenstein’s writings.<ref>''{{plainlink|See [https://www.onb.ac.at/bibliothek/sammlungen/handschriften-und-alte-drucke/this-is-the-last-will-of-me-ludwig-wittgenstein This is the last will of me Ludwig Wittgenstein]}}'', Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, retrieved 16 July 2002 ({{plainlink|[https://web.archive.org/web/20220716092558/https://www.onb.ac.at/bibliothek/sammlungen/handschriften-und-alte-drucke/this-is-the-last-will-of-me-ludwig-wittgenstein archived URL]}}).''</ref>
Ludwig Wittgenstein died on 29 April 1951. In his last will and testament, he appointed G.E.M. Anscombe, R. Rhees and G.H. von Wright as his literary heirs. Thus, they became the copyright holders for Wittgenstein’s writings.<ref>''{{plainlink|See [https://www.onb.ac.at/bibliothek/sammlungen/handschriften-und-alte-drucke/this-is-the-last-will-of-me-ludwig-wittgenstein This is the last will of me Ludwig Wittgenstein]}}'', Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, retrieved 16 July 2002 ({{plainlink|[https://web.archive.org/web/20220716092558/https://www.onb.ac.at/bibliothek/sammlungen/handschriften-und-alte-drucke/this-is-the-last-will-of-me-ludwig-wittgenstein archived URL]}}).''</ref>


In the second half of the 20th century, it was them who made (or sometimes delegated) the decisions about what to publish and how and it was them who had a right to receive royalties for the sales of books.
In the second half of the 20th century, they made (or sometimes delegated) the decisions about what to publish and how, and they had a right to receive royalties for the sales of books.


Rhees died in 1989, Anscombe in 2001, and Von Wright in 2003. Although the author of this essay was unable to find a detailed account of their wills and testaments, it is clear that, after their deaths, the copyright holders for Wittgenstein’s writings became The Master and Fellows of Trinity College at the University of Cambridge. This leads us to think that it was Rhees’s, Anscombe’s, and Von Wright’s joint will to elect Trinity as the heir to the intellectual property of Wittgenstein’s writings.
Rhees died in 1989, Anscombe in 2001, and Von Wright in 2003. Although the author of this essay was unable to find a detailed account of their wills and testaments, it is clear that, after their deaths, the copyright holders for Wittgenstein’s writings became The Master and Fellows of Trinity College at the University of Cambridge. This leads us to think that it was Rhees’s, Anscombe’s, and Von Wright’s joint will to elect Trinity as the heir to the intellectual property of Wittgenstein’s writings.


29 April 2021 was the 70th anniversary of Wittgenstein’s death and on 1 January 2022 Wittgenstein’s writings entered the public domain in those countries where the copyright term is 70 years P.M.A. (''post mortem auctoris'', i.e., “after the author’s death”). This includes most European countries, much of Africa, Asia and Oceania, and most Latin American Countries. In some jurisdictions, for example many African and Asian countries, but also Canada, where the copyright term is 50 years P.M.A., Wittgenstein’s works were already in the public domain. In some other countries, for example the United States, where copyright laws are rather different than in most other countries and determining the copyright status of a work is not simply a matter of counting the years that have elapsed since the author’s death, some of Wittgenstein’s works are still copyrighted; there, it is still Trinity that counts as the copyright holder.
29 April 2021 was the 70th anniversary of Wittgenstein’s death and on 1 January 2022 Wittgenstein’s writings entered the public domain in those countries where the copyright term is 70 years P.M.A. (''post mortem auctoris'', i.e., “after the author’s death”). This includes most European countries, much of Africa, Asia and Oceania, and most Latin American Countries. In some jurisdictions, including many African and Asian countries, as well as Canada, where the copyright term is 50 years P.M.A., Wittgenstein’s works were already in the public domain. In some other countries, such as the United States, where copyright laws are rather different than in most other countries and determining the copyright status of a work is not simply a matter of counting the years that have elapsed since the author’s death, some of Wittgenstein’s works are still copyrighted; there, it is still Trinity that counts as the copyright holder.




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