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|content=-->"Philosophical Investigations" is the title that Wittgenstein, starting from the mid-1930s, attributed to a collection of German-language manuscripts, often converted into typescripts, which he repeatedly, extensively, and compulsively revised in an attempt to shape his second book of philosophy. Even if the resulting typescript (Ts-227 in von Wright's catalogue) is considered to be the most polished among the later Wittgenstein's writings, the book did not see the light of day during the author's lifetime: it was only in 1953 that Wittgenstein's literary executors posthumously published the text along with G.E.M. Anscombe’s English translation, in a form that has not failed to provoke criticism due to the inclusion of a so-called “Part II” of the work. The content of this section consists of materials written between 1947 and 1949, which Wittgenstein made a selection of and had typed out (the resulting typescript was catalogued as Ts-234). G.E.M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees claimed that it was his intention to incorporate these contents into the final version of the work, but they also made it clear that it was their decision to attach "Part II", in its relatively "raw" form, to the relatively "finished" text of "Part I". Additionally, the themes discussed in "Part II" are more closely related to the work Wittgenstein carried out on the philosophy of psychology after 1945. For these reasons, on our website, we exclusively reproduce what is known as "Part I" of the work, as do an increasing number of recent editions of the ''Philosophical Investications'' – for example, Joachim Schulte's [https://www.suhrkamp.de/buch/ludwig-wittgenstein-philosophische-untersuchungen-t-9783518223727 German edition]. Schulte also observes that the integration proposed by the literary executors, while it was welcome at the time of publication as it allowed the reader of the ''Investigations'' to become acquainted with reflections by Wittgenstein that would otherwise have remained unknown for many years, is now superfluous, because the content of "Part II" is now widely available thanks to the electronic editions of the ''Nachlass''.
|content=-->"Philosophical Investigations" is the title that Wittgenstein, starting from the mid-1930s, attributed to a collection of German-language manuscripts, often converted into typescripts, which he repeatedly, extensively, and compulsively revised in an attempt to shape his second book of philosophy. Even if the resulting typescript (Ts-227 in von Wright's catalogue) is considered to be the most polished among the later Wittgenstein's writings, the book did not see the light of day during the author's lifetime: it was only in 1953 that Wittgenstein's literary executors posthumously published the text along with G.E.M. Anscombe’s English translation, in a form that has not failed to provoke criticism due to the inclusion of a so-called “Part II” of the work. The content of this section consists of materials written between 1947 and 1949, which Wittgenstein made a selection of and had typed out (the resulting typescript was catalogued as Ts-234). G.E.M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees claimed that it was his intention to incorporate these contents into the final version of the work, but they also made it clear that it was their decision to attach "Part II", in its relatively "raw" form, to the relatively "finished" text of "Part I". Additionally, the themes discussed in "Part II" are more closely related to the work Wittgenstein carried out on the philosophy of psychology after 1945. For these reasons, on our website, we exclusively reproduce what is known as "Part I" of the work, as do an increasing number of recent editions of the ''Philosophical Investications'' – for example, Joachim Schulte's [https://www.suhrkamp.de/buch/ludwig-wittgenstein-philosophische-untersuchungen-t-9783518223727 German edition]. Schulte also observes that the integration proposed by the literary executors, while it was welcome at the time of publication as it allowed the reader of the ''Investigations'' to become acquainted with reflections by Wittgenstein that would otherwise have remained unknown for many years, is now superfluous, because the content of "Part II" is now widely available thanks to the electronic editions of the ''Nachlass''.


Although the final version of the first part of the work was only composed between 1943 and 1945, with some marginal rehashes thereafter, it would be flawed to argue that the ''Investigations'' reflect a phase of Wittgenstein's thought whose scope is limited to the early 1940s. As he writes in the Preface, the ideas contained in the book are "the precipitate of philosophical investigations which have occupied me for the last sixteen years". Therefore, the ''Philosophical Investigations'' can be considered a synthesis of Wittgenstein's mature thought, following his return to philosophy in 1929. Once again, the result of years of gestation was a complex work, devoid of a hierarchical structure and a definitive status unlike the ''Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'', but equally rich and surprising.
Although the final version of the first part of the work was only composed between 1943 and 1945, with some marginal rehashes thereafter, it would be flawed to argue that the ''Investigations'' reflect a phase of Wittgenstein's thought whose scope is limited to the early 1940s. As he writes in the Preface, the ideas contained in the book are "the precipitate of philosophical investigations which have occupied me for the last sixteen years". Therefore, the ''Philosophical Investigations'' can be considered a synthesis of Wittgenstein's mature thought, following his return to philosophy in 1929. The result of so many years of gestation is a complex work, lacking a hierarchical structure and a definitive status like those of the ''Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'', but equally rich and surprising.


In the 693 numbered paragraphs of the first part of the work, which follow slender and rarely explicit logical threads, Wittgenstein addresses many subjects, as summarized in the Preface: “the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition and sentence, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things”, without, however, providing a systematic treatment of them, but rather free remarks or, as the author puts it, “a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of those long and meandering journeys”. This method corresponds to a renewed conception of the nature of the philosophical enterprise, which Wittgenstein presents in paragraphs 109-133: as he had already argued in the ''Tractatus'', the aim is to solve philosophical pseudo-problems by dissolving the confusions that arise in the everyday use of language. However, for the author of the ''Investigations'', this activity of clarification no longer involves a refinement of the linguistic code according to ideal, logical criteria. “Every sentence in our [ordinary] language is in order as it is” ([[Philosophische Untersuchungen#98|§ 98]]): these kind of observations convey the idea that the principles that define the meaningfulness of language reside within language itself, and its intelligibility does not derive from compliance with logical rules, but rather from "grammatical" rules, that is, from the overall evaluation of the diverse uses of signs. Consequently, the philosopher's task does not consist in providing explanations about the nature of language, but rather in offering descriptions of language use, thus elucidating the inconspicuous implications of the linguistic activity that are not immediately recognizable.
In the book's 693 numbered paragraphs, which follow slender and rarely explicit logical threads, Wittgenstein addresses many subjects, as summarized in the Preface: "the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition and sentence, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things", without, however, providing a systematic treatment of them, but rather free remarks or, as the author puts it, "a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of those long and meandering journeys". This method corresponds to a renewed conception of the nature of the philosophical enterprise, which Wittgenstein presents in paragraphs 109–133: as he had already argued in the ''Tractatus'', the aim is to solve philosophical pseudo-problems by dissolving the confusions that arise in the everyday use of language. However, for the author of the ''Investigations'', this activity, this task of bringing clarity, no longer involves a refinement of the linguistic code according to ideal, logical criteria. "Every sentence in our [ordinary] language is in order as it is" ([[Philosophische Untersuchungen#98|§ 98]]): observations of this kind convey the idea that the principles that determine the meaningfulness of language reside within language itself, and its intelligibility does not derive from compliance with absolute logical rules, but rather from "grammatical" rules, that is, from the overall evaluation of the practical and diverse uses of signs. Consequently, the philosopher's task does not consist in providing explanations about the nature of language, but rather in offering descriptions of the use of language, thus elucidating those inconspicuous implications of the linguistic activity that are not immediately recognizable.


Throughout the work, therefore, Wittgenstein establishes some cornerstones of his new thought, such as the idea that “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” ([[Philosophische Untersuchungen#43|§ 43]]): in order to know the meaning of a sign, one must observe the situations in which that sign is used, evaluate the ways in which its usage is taught, and the customary practices by which that usage is transmitted, preserved, or transformed. Hence, Wittgenstein's constant tendency to put on scenes of instruction or plausible episodes from the lives of less civilised people, to demonstrate that even the most basic form of complex linguistic-conceptual constructions, such as mathematics or abstract reasoning, is not a system of propositions based on logical laws, but a set of elementary practices, whose rules are mastered by the owners of a given language through training.
Throughout the work, thus, Wittgenstein establishes some cornerstones of his new thought, such as the idea that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" ([[Philosophische Untersuchungen#43|§ 43]]): in order to know the meaning of a sign, one must observe the situations in which that sign is used, examine the ways in which its usage is taught, and the customary practices by which that usage is transmitted, preserved, or transformed. Hence, Wittgenstein's constant appeal to imaginary scenes of instruction or plausible episodes from the lives of less civilised people, to demonstrate that even the most basic form of complex linguistic-conceptual constructions, such as mathematics or abstract reasoning, is not a system of propositions based on unchanging logical laws, but a set of elementary practices, whose rules are mastered by the owners of a given language through training.


The inclination to disappoint the rationalist perspectives with a heuristic approach to language and to present several “language games” as “objects of comparison” ([[Philosophische Untersuchungen#130|§ 130]]) for examining the meaning of problematic expressions represents both a critique of classical theories of language, built upon the concepts of "representation", "proposition", and "logical atomism" (including those presented in the ''Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus''), and a renewal of the research method. Language, according to Wittgenstein, plays a role only when it is engaged in specific activities. With language, we do all sorts of things: that is why every language has sense within a specific "form of life", which is the set of contexts and circumstances that contribute to determining meanings, and the famous expression “language-''game''” is precisely intended “to emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life” ([[Philosophische Untersuchungen#23|§ 23]]).
The inclination to disappoint the rationalist perspectives with a heuristic approach to language and to present several "language games" as "objects of comparison" ([[Philosophische Untersuchungen#130|§ 130]]) for examining the meaning of problematic expressions represents both a critique of classical theories of language, built upon the concepts of "representation", "proposition", and "logical atomism" (including those presented in the ''Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus''), and a renewal of philosophy's research method. Language, according to Wittgenstein, only works when speakers are engaged in specific activities. With language, we do all sorts of things: that is why every language has sense within a specific "form of life", which is the set of contexts and circumstances that contribute to determining meanings, and the famous expression “language-''game''” is precisely intended "to emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life" ([[Philosophische Untersuchungen#23|§ 23]]).


The themes explored by Wittgenstein are too numerous and disparate to be briefly summarized. He focuses on the ostensive learning of language, challenging the ideas attributed to Augustine; he discusses the concepts of "rule" and "understanding"; he introduces the notion of "family resemblances" ([[Philosophische Untersuchungen#67|§ 67]]) to draw attention to the similarities and differences of the use of the same sign in different contexts; he raises questions on the relationship between word and thought and the plausibility of a "private language" in a series of famous reasonings that include the example of the "beetle in the box" (from which the logo of our project is derived, [[Philosophische Untersuchungen#293|§ 293]]). But, essentially, in both the first and second parts of the work, Wittgenstein unceasingly applies the principles of his new philosophical method: by presenting several examples, thought experiments, imaginary situations, and comparisons, he examines the “misunderstandings concerning the use of words […] in different regions of our language” ([[Philosophische Untersuchungen#90|§ 90]]) and encourages the reader to adopt a more cautious and contextual approach to understanding language, ultimately arguing that what we call “philosophical problems” are merely confusions, which are only dispelled by achieving a “perspicuous representation” ([[Philosophische Untersuchungen#122|§ 122]]) of our ordinary language.
The themes explored by Wittgenstein are too numerous and disparate to be briefly summarized. He focuses on the ostensive learning of language, challenging ideas he attributes to Augustine; he discusses the concepts of "rule" and "understanding"; he introduces the notion of "family resemblances" ([[Philosophische Untersuchungen#67|§ 67]]) to draw attention to the similarities and differences in the use of the same sign in different contexts; he raises questions on the relationship between word and thought and the plausibility of a "private language" in a series of famous reasonings that include the example of the "beetle in the box" (from which the logo of our project is derived, [[Philosophische Untersuchungen#293|§ 293]]). But, essentially, Wittgenstein unceasingly applies the principles of his new philosophical method: by presenting several examples, thought experiments, imaginary situations, and comparisons, he examines the "misunderstandings concerning the use of words […] in different regions of our language" ([[Philosophische Untersuchungen#90|§ 90]]) and encourages the reader to adopt a more cautious and contextual approach to understanding language, ultimately arguing that what we call "philosophical problems" are merely confusions, which are only dispelled by achieving a "perspicuous representation" ([[Philosophische Untersuchungen#122|§ 122]]) of our ordinary language.


The style of the ''Philosophical Investigations'' is often aphoristic and fragmented. Wittgenstein repeatedly expressed his dissatisfaction with the form he was able to give to the book, as he recalls at the end of the Preface. It is not surprising that many passages have generated lively interpretative debates and continue to do so. Its nature as an open work, the hypnotic structure of the argumentation, and the innovative variety of themes and methodology make it a milestone in recent philosophy, at least on par with the ''Tractatus Logico-philosophicus'', as demonstrated by the massive influence this text had on the development of the so-called "ordinary language philosophy" and on Western thought as a whole in the second half of the 20th century.
The style of the ''Philosophical Investigations'' is often aphoristic and fragmented. Wittgenstein repeatedly expressed his dissatisfaction with the form he was able to give to the book – for example, at the end of the Preface. It is not surprising that many passages have generated lively interpretative debates and continue to do so. Its nature as an open work, the hypnotic structure of the argumentation, and the innovative variety of themes and methodology make it a milestone in recent philosophy, at least on par with the ''Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'', as is proved by the massive influence this text has had on the development of ordinary language philosophy and on Western thought as a whole in the second half of the 20th century and beyond.




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